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ABSTRACT 
The United States government has identified under-
governed areas in weakened or failed states as one of the 
threats faced by the U.S. and its allies because these 
spaces can provide safe havens for terrorists.  Under 
certain circumstances, the United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) may choose to counter these threats by 
utilizing specific elements of the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) to work indirectly through 
irregular forces who can achieve control over and legitimacy 
with the populations within these under-governed areas.  
This study uses the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan to determine how irregular forces, 
with external support, can establish political control of 
under-governed space.  To a more limited extent, this study 
also determines methods that Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
can utilize to influence irregular surrogates, should SOF 
choose to operate by, with, and through them to attempt to 
establish control of under-governed space within weakened or 
failed states in support of United States foreign policy.  
This study provides lessons learned and potential 
implications for emerging DoD irregular warfare (IW) 
literature and future DoD and USSOCOM IW doctrine design and 
operational planning. 
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In its efforts to come to grips with the complex tasks 
that it faces in its war on terror, the United States 
government has developed numerous strategic documents which 
identify likely threats within the future global security 
environment.  These strategies also address U.S. strategic 
goals and existing U.S. capability gaps.  The United States’ 
National Security Strategy identified ungoverned areas in 
weakened or failed states as one of the threats faced by the 
U.S. and its allies because these spaces could provide safe 
havens for terrorists.1  To counter this threat, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) states within its National 
Defense Strategy that DoD will prevent the exploitation of 
“ungoverned spaces and border areas.”2 
However, in states which may be unwilling or unable to 
control their sovereign territory, simply occupying these 
spaces with large numbers of U.S. soldiers poses the 
potential dual threat of draining U.S. political will and 
bolstering potential enemy will.  A future strategy of this 
type would expose U.S. soldiers to missions that are often 
viewed as endless quagmires by the United States public and 
occupations by some foreign audiences.  To add to the 
                     
1 United States Government, The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf, 
(accessed October 17, 2007), 15. 
2 Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf, 
(accessed October 17, 2007), 11. 
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complexity of future problems, operating by, with, and 
through host nation security forces may prove undesirable if 
the populations residing within particular under-governed 
areas find the state and its indigenous security forces 
illegitimate because they have failed to meet the security 
and welfare needs of the population, or have abused or 
exploited the population in the past. 
To overcome these problems, DoD could attempt to 
establish control of an under-governed space working 
indirectly through surrogate irregular forces if those 
forces had attributes that were desirable to the U.S. such 
as appropriate access, placement, and legitimacy with 
relevant local populations and a willingness to accept 
assistance from the United States.  Unfortunately, the 
irregular techniques required by this strategy are under-
developed by the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, 
and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
and are identified as capability gaps to be addressed in 
future Special Operations Forces (SOF).3 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to determine how irregular 
forces, with external support, can establish political 
control of under-governed spaces in weakened or failed 
                     
3 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf (accessed October 
17, 2007); Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating 
Concept (JOC) Version 1.0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2007); United States Special Operations Command, Capstone 
Concept for Special Operations (MacDill Air Force Base: Futures 
Directorate, Center for Knowledge & Futures, 2006), 
http://www.socom.mil/Docs/USSOCOM_CCSO_2006web.pdf, (accessed February 
23, 2007). 
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states.  This work will utilize case studies to examine 
techniques that irregular forces have utilized to establish 
political control of under-governed spaces in the past.  To 
a more limited extent, this study will also assess which 
methods Special Operations Forces can utilize to influence 
irregular surrogates, should SOF choose to operate by, with, 
and through them to attempt to establish control of under-
governed space within weakened or failed states in support 
of United States foreign policy. 
This study adds to emerging DoD irregular warfare (IW) 
literature, and offers additional evidence for future DoD 
and USSOCOM IW doctrine design and operational planning.  
This study should serve to add substance to the IW framework 
which DoD hopes to utilize in future warfare.  The 
techniques captured in this study should assist SOF by 
enhancing their ability to indirectly establish control of 
under-governed areas operating by, with, and through 
irregular forces in order to deny potential sanctuary for 
threats to the United States.  These techniques will also 
enhance SOF’s ability to re-establish control after 
successfully working by, with, and through irregular forces 
in an unconventional warfare campaign.  Both of the above 
circumstances will require irregular forces to establish 
political control in under-governed spaces in order to 
prevent physical sanctuaries for threats to the United 
States and its allies. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The remainder of this chapter will define the concepts 
of irregular warfare, under-governed space, and political 
control.  Chapter II will present a case study on how the 
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irregular forces of Hezbollah were able to establish control 
of under-governed spaces in Lebanon with the assistance of 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.  Chapter III will 
present a case study on how the irregular forces of the 
Taliban were able to establish control of under-governed 
spaces in Afghanistan with the assistance of Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence.  From these case studies, 
Chapter IV will conclude by discussing methods irregular 
forces and SOF working with these forces can use to 
establish political control of under-governed spaces in 
weakened or failed states, describing additional “lessons 
learned” about irregular warfare, and identifying some 
potential implications to suggest future research. 
D. IRREGULAR WARFARE 
What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its 
operations—a relevant population—and its 
strategic purpose—to gain or maintain control or 
influence over, and the support of, that relevant 
population through political, psychological, and 
economic methods.4 
-2007 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept 
The Department of Defense first specified irregular 
warfare as a form of warfare in its 2005 National Defense 
Strategy.5  DoD determined that its joint forces must 
improve their proficiency against “irregular challenges” 
such as those created by terrorist extremist organizations 
and their state and non-state supporters.6  Based upon this 
                     
4 IW JOC, 9. 
5 2005 National Defense Strategy, 2. 
6 2005 National Defense Strategy, 18. 
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strategic guidance, DoD published its 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) where it specified DoD requirements for 
improving its capacity and capability to conduct irregular 
warfare to defeat terrorist networks to include the 
capability of SOF to conduct “sustained unconventional 
warfare” and foreign internal defense.7  The QDR directed 
the development of a follow-on irregular warfare “road map” 
which further defined irregular warfare and tasked USSOCOM 
to develop a joint operating concept for how future joint 
forces will conduct irregular warfare. 
In the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept 
(JOC) Version 1.0, DoD defines irregular warfare as “a 
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”8  
IW is a form of warfare in contrast to conventional warfare 
which is defined as a form of warfare between states whose 
focus is an adversary’s military forces with the objective 
of influencing the adversary’s government.9  Conventional 
warfare generally assumes that indigenous populations within 
operational areas will not be involved in fighting and will 
accept the outcome determined by the belligerent 
governments.10  “In contrast, IW focuses on the control or 




                     
7 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 23. 
8 IW JOC, 6. 
9 IW JOC, 7-8. 
10 IW JOC, 8. 
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adversary’s forces or territory.”11  The warfare occurs to 
establish control or influence over, and the support of, a 
relevant population.12 
The 2006 QDR specified that irregular warfare involved 
“operations in which the enemy is not a regular military 
force of a nation-state.”13  This correctly identified that 
one of the key actors in irregular warfare campaigns will be 
irregular forces which DoD defines as armed individuals or 
groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, 
police, or other internal security forces of a state.  
However, these actors are not always enemies of the United 
States.  A default of the United States and its military is 
to habitually view irregular forces, such as militias, as 
illicit actors because they are not officially sanctioned by 
the state system which the United States, as the world’s 
most powerful state, has justified reasons to support.  
Nevertheless, in certain cases, irregular forces have been 
and can be viable partners for the United States to work 
indirectly through to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives.14 
When SOF, in particular Army Special Forces, conduct 
unconventional warfare, they do so by operating by, with, 
and through irregular forces.  In these operations, 
irregular forces become surrogates of Special Forces who can 
conduct operations in support of United States objectives 
                     
11 IW JOC, 8. 
12 IW JOC, 8. 
13 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 11. 
14 Terry L. Hodgson and Glenn R. Thomas, “Rethinking Militias: 
Recognizing the Potential Role of Militia Groups in Nation-Building” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007). 
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which the United States cannot achieve unilaterally.  One of 
these objectives may be to establish control of under-
governed spaces in order to deny sanctuary or safe haven to 
enemies of the United States. 
E. UNDER-GOVERNED SPACE 
Illicit individuals and groups who use armed violence 
in ways which threaten the United States and its allies 
routinely attempt to operate clandestinely and out of reach 
of licit authority.15  Whether their operations involve 
private financial gain such as narcotics and arms 
trafficking, or violent political strategies such as 
terrorism and insurgency, illicit actors derive substantial 
benefits from areas which provide them with refuge to 
recruit, train, sustain, plan, and replenish free from the 
view and influence of the United States government and its 
allies.16  Additionally, these areas can provide illicit 
actors with enhanced war-fighting skills, if the local 
situation provides an opportunity for on the job training in 
guerrilla warfare and criminal activities.17 
These sanctuaries or safe havens exist for a variety of 
reasons and a variety of circumstances some of which relate 
to the degree of governance existing in each specific area, 
                     
15 Robert Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens,” 
Draft 0.61, (Draft Working Paper/Pre-decisional paper developed by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy through the Ungoverned Areas 
Project, an interagency project managed by the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, Department of Defense, 
Washington D.C., May 2007), 1. 
16 Lamb, 1.  See also: Anna Simons and David Tucker, "The Misleading 
Problem of Failed States: a ‘socio-geography’ of terrorism in the post-
9/11 era," Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 394. 
17 Simons and Tucker, 389-390. 
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where governance consists of the security, both internal and 
external, and services, such as health care, sanitation, 
education, or utilities such as electricity and water, 
provided to the population by a political organization.  It 
is important to note that the relevant governing 
organization does not have to provide all of the security 
and services to a population as some security and some 
services may be provided by private or commercial sources.  
However, the governing organization must be able to either 
provide security and services to a level that is deemed 
culturally legitimate to the local population or be able to 
control those who do.  The U.S. considers those areas where 
governments fail to meet the above criteria to be potential 
security threats. 
These areas are described using various names and 
various definitions depending on the source.  An area may be 
defined as un-governed when the state performs none of its 
governance functions effectively, or in rare occasions when 
no state government actually exists (e.g., at certain 
periods in Somalia).18  An area may be defined as under-
governed when the state performs only some governance 
functions effectively, either in a specific area, or 
throughout its entire territory (e.g., the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan).19  An area may be 
defined as misgoverned or ill-governed when a significant 
faction of a state performs its governance functions in such 
a manner that allows exploitation by illicit actors (e.g., 
when Al Qaeda received sanctuary in Afghanistan under the 
                     
18 Lamb, 6. 
19 Lamb, 6. 
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Taliban).20  These factions may misgovern intentionally or 
unintentionally due to state sponsorship, or state neglect 
or corruption.21  Finally, an area may be defined as 
contested when the state fails to perform some or all of its 
governance functions because of state incapacity, failure, 
or collapse related to war or a political decision to 
surrender authority over specific places or functions, and 
illicit actors fill the void in governance (e.g., FARC-
controlled territories in Colombia). 
For the purposes of this study, the term under-governed 
will be used to describe areas where the internationally 
recognized government, and its associated local governments, 
do not possess the capability, capacity, or desire to 
monopolize or control the provision of internal and external 
security, or the provision of services to a level deemed 
culturally legitimate by the populations in those areas. 
When people discuss these areas and their associated 
levels of governance, they usually refer to the level of 
governance provided by the state responsible for that area, 
but services and security are often provided in these areas 
by non-state actors through forms of “shadow” governance.22  
For example, when states fail, warlords, militias, and even 
terrorists may seek to provide security and services to gain 
strength, power, and legitimacy.23 
                     
20 Lamb, 7. 
21 Lamb, 7. 
22 Anne L. Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, "Conceptualizing 'Ungoverned 
Spaces': Territorial Statehood, Contested Authority and Softened 
Sovereignty," (Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 30-
September 2, 2007). 
23 Simons and Tucker, 391-393. 
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The common denominator in these areas is that actors, 
whether state or non-state, licit or illicit, can provide 
levels of governance to local populations which will affect 
their ability to control or influence populations in these 
areas, and their ability to determine who will be allowed to 
operate from or within these areas.  In future irregular 
warfare campaigns, SOF must understand the nuances of this 
governance and how to manage these nuances to gain and 
maintain control and influence in these areas through their 
relevant populations. 
F. POLITICAL CONTROL 
As noted by DoD in the IW JOC, the strategies of 
irregular warfare will likely focus on the control and 
influence of a relevant population.24  In order to gain and 
maintain control, state or non-state actors must use both 
persuasion and coercion.25 
The persuasion can involve the provision of services 
such as security, justice, education, health care, or 
sanitation that prove beneficial to a population.  These 
services, if provided to a level deemed culturally 
acceptable to the relevant population, can lead to a  
 
                     
24 IW JOC, 6. 
25 The author would like to credit Dr. Gordon McCormick for 
introducing many of the ideas involved in the development of the term 
political control.  In particular, the concept that control of a 
population will involve a combination of coercion and consensus.  This 
study limits consensus-building to the provision of services, but Dr. 
McCormick describes other factors such as the degree of ethnic 
homogeneity which affect the level of consensus and stability in a given 
society.  Dr. McCormick’s term consensus describes the level of 
legitimacy that a governing organization achieves in a given population 
in the sense that a population feels a governing organization deserves 
support. 
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consensus amongst that population that it benefits from this 
governance, and assist in gaining or maintaining stability 
in that population. 
However, in all populations, some form of coercion will 
also be necessary to ensure that illicit actors do not 
destabilize a population through their activities.  Even in 
the United States, criminal organizations such as gangs and 
mafias exist because they seek financial gain from illicit 
activity.  These activities impose costs upon the 
populations they occur within, but U.S. law enforcement 
agencies possess the ability to detect and disrupt these 
organizations.  None of these criminal organizations can 
grow to a size or power which prevents U.S. law enforcement 
from, upon detection, entering a given area and defeating 
the illicit threats through arrests or if necessary lethal 
force. 
Conversely, too much coercion can be deemed 
illegitimate.  To use the U.S. example again, U.S. law 
enforcement agencies are severely constrained in their 
powers of search and seizure because the U.S. population 
does not wish to live in a police state.  Since the United 
States is relatively stable, this lower level of coercion is 
possible.  Thus, to maintain control of the citizens of a 
population, a governing organization must also be capable of 
detecting and disrupting threats in an area to a level 
deemed culturally acceptable to the relevant population in 
order to ensure security and stability. 
In order for state or non-state actors to gain and 
maintain control of a relevant population, both the 
persuasion of service provision and the coercion of force 
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will be necessary.  The amount of persuasion or coercion 
will vary in each situation dependent upon various 
political, economic, and social factors.  In some 
circumstances, a population may only expect small amounts of 
service provision, but may require a high level of coercion 
for it to stabilize and come under control.  In different 
circumstances, stability and control may be obtained through 
large amounts of service provision and only a small amount 
of coercion.  An extremely unstable environment may require 
high amounts of both service provision and coercion.  In 
short, instability and a lack of control will occur where a 
governing organization does not provide the proper amounts 
of persuasion and coercion.  In these circumstances, 
grievances can exist and a lack of coercive capability can 
provide a gap for exploitation by destabilizing forces such 
as illicit actors.  A governing organization must be capable 
of providing the appropriate levels of persuasion and 
coercion to a relevant population in order to establish 
control and stability. 
For the purpose of this study, political control is 
defined as the power of an organization to direct or 
influence a population, achieved through persuasion and 
coercion, where the organization possesses the ability to 
detect and disrupt threats and the ability to facilitate 
social and economic activity within a given area.  With 
political control, a state or non-state actor would be able 
to secure a population from control by illicit actors and 
deny sanctuary to an enemy threat such as a terrorist, 




denied when the governing organization can prevent enemy 
threats from operating from or within controlled areas in an 
effective capacity.26 
As discussed, gaining political control in under-
governed space will require varying degrees of persuasion 
and coercion as political, economic, social, and cultural 
factors will vary in each relevant population, and in some 
environments, irregular forces may possess the ability to 
achieve the desired political control.  The cases of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in Afghanistan provide 
examples of how irregular forces, with external support, 
gained political control of under-governed space. 
                     
26 Policy makers should define effective capacity when they describe 
their desired end state to their subordinates in their strategic plans.  
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II. THE RISE OF HEZBOLLAH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Between 1982 and 1992, the irregular forces of 
Hezbollah successfully established political control of 
under-governed spaces in southern Lebanon.  As they 
established control, Hezbollah utilized not only protracted 
military methods, but political, social, economic, and 
informational ones as well to establish political control of 
the populations in their under-governed enclaves in the 
Bekaa Valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and in areas 
of south Lebanon.  Hezbollah received training and advice 
from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps whose shadowy, 
protracted support of and influence over their surrogates 
served both Hezbollah’s and Iran’s needs and provide 
examples of tactics, techniques, and procedures for 
operating by, with, and through irregular forces. 
In order to fully understand the rise of the Hezbollah, 
one must appreciate the contemporary history of the 
fractured state of Lebanon. 
B. LEBANON’S COLLAPSE 
The nation of Lebanon, which gained its independence 
from France in 1943, consisted of seventeen sectarian groups 
or sects who were accorded political privilege based 
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proportionally upon each sect’s size within Lebanon.27  In 
1948, when the state of Israel was founded, over 100,000 
Palestinian refugees flooded southern Lebanon.28  In 1970-
71, following the civil war in Jordan, thousands of armed 
Palestinian guerrillas from the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) also entered Southern Lebanon.29  These 
PLO militants challenged the Lebanese government and 
established “a virtual state within-a-state encompassing 
west Beirut and much of southern Lebanon.”30  This strife 
between various sects, particularly Christian Maronites, and 
the PLO vying for power within Lebanon resulted in the 
outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975.31  This Civil 
War eroded the authority of the state, leaving large 
portions of the country under-governed.32  As the Civil War 
took place, the different sects began to establish enclaves 
which were protected by militias from each respective sect.  
Meanwhile, the PLO launched attacks against Israel from the 
under-governed sanctuary of southern Lebanon.33 
                     
27 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 11.  See also: Augustus Richard 
Norton, Hezbollah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 3; Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the 
Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 12; 
Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 124. 
28 Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), 219; Norton, 2007, 14; Norton, 1999, 6; Hamzeh, 
15. 
29 Sami G. Hajjar, Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation, or 
Menace? (Strategic Studies Institute: Army War College, 2002), 3; 
Norton, 2007, 14; Norton, 1999, 6; Hamzeh, 15; Jaber, 219. 
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C. HEZBOLLAH 
Since Lebanese independence, the Shia population 
occupied a tertiary political position in accordance with 
the Lebanese National Pact which formed the government.  Due 
to the political patronage system in Lebanon, the Shia 
population fell behind their Christian and Sunni 
counterparts economically as well.34 
In the 1960s, Shia activism arose in an effort to 
address the inequalities within Lebanon’s confessional 
political system.  A key leader in this activism was Imam 
Musa al-Sadr who established charitable institutions and a 
reformist movement in the 1970s aimed at empowering the 
impoverished Shia community.35  In 1975, al-Sadr raised an 
armed Shia militia named Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniya 
(Legions of the Lebanese Resistance), known popularly by its 
acronym, AMAL.36  In 1978, al-Sadr mysteriously disappeared 
during a trip to Libya, and AMAL came under the leadership 
of a lawyer named Nabih Berri, who led AMAL towards a more 
secular path, but also into confrontation with the PLO who 
were oppressing, and causing Israeli reprisals upon, the 
Shia community in southern Lebanon.37 
In July of 1982, Israel launched its Peace of Galilee 
operation and invaded Lebanon in order to clear the PLO from 
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its sanctuary in southern Lebanon.38  At first, the Israeli 
invasion was welcomed by many in the Shia community because 
it removed the yoke of the PLO from southern Lebanon.39  
Unfortunately, as time passed and Israel failed to exit 
Lebanon, their liberation began to be viewed as an 
occupation.40 
The Israeli occupation led to the birth of Hezbollah.41  
While AMAL had transitioned to a more secular organization 
and attempted to work through the Lebanese state system, a 
small group of Shia clerics trained in the religious center 
of Najaf, Iraq alongside prominent Shia ayatollahs, to 
include Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, broke from AMAL.42  Based 
upon the relationship established between the shadowy Shia 
clerics and Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf in the previous 
decade, this uncompromising clerical cabal accepted 
financial and training assistance from Iran to form 
Hezbollah, “the Party of God.”43  Hezbollah aimed to drive 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Western forces out of 
Lebanon, empower the Shia plurality in Lebanon, and 
ultimately hoped to establish an Islamic State in Lebanon 
modeled on Iran.44 
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D. 1982-1992 
Hezbollah spent its early years between 1982 and 1985 
operating covertly as a nameless, loosely organized group.  
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deployed 1,500 
of their Pasdaran to the town of Baalbeck in the Bekaa 
Valley where they trained and advised Hezbollah 
guerrillas.45  The Bekaa Valley was not occupied by the 
Israelis, or controlled by the Lebanese government, and thus 
provided a sanctuary for the IRGC to train its surrogates in 
Hezbollah.46  These guerrillas, upon completion of their 
training, were infiltrated into south Lebanon to add their 
guerrilla attacks against the IDF and their proxy Christian 
militias to the attacks by other resistance militias from 
rival groups such as AMAL. 
During these early years of its resistance, Hezbollah 
was also either involved in, or linked to, the suicide 
bombings of the IDF military headquarters in the southern 
city of Tyre in November, 1982; the U.S. Embassy in April 
1983; and the bombings of the U.S. and French barracks in 
October 1983 which resulted in the U.S. and French 
withdrawal from Lebanon in February 1984.47  Hezbollah was 
also associated with, or involved in the western hostage 
crisis.  Lebanese hostage-taking involved long-term covert 
and clandestine operations which involved multiple groups, 
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to include Iran, whose purposes varied around interests in 
negating western influence in Lebanon, attempts to coerce 
Israel and Kuwait to release Palestinian and Lebanese 
political prisoners, and outright criminal greed.48 
Hezbollah controlled its organization via a 
consultative council of mostly religious leaders called the 
Majlis al-Shura.  The council supervised seven committees 
which focused on ideological, financial, military, 
political, judicial, informational, and social affairs 
operations.49  Each of these seven committees was replicated 
in Hezbollah’s three areas of control (Bekaa Valley, Beirut, 
and southern Lebanon).50  Additionally, two Iranians from 
either the Pasdaran or the Iranian embassy participated in 
the council’s decision-making and the overall strategic 
planning and decision-making.51  At times, Hezbollah seemed 
so synched with Iranian ideology and guidance that critics 
considered them an organizational extension of Iran and not 
subject to the traditional internal strife and power 
struggles within typical irregular resistance organizations, 
but Hezbollah was far from a monolith.52  Although Hezbollah 
shared a strong common ideology both internally and with 
Iran which eliminated many possible fractures, Hezbollah 
still suffered differences of strategy and opinion 
throughout their existence.  They overcame these through the 
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strength of their underlying clerical network rather than 
blind followership of Iranian foreign policy.53 
In February of 1985, Israel withdrew to south of the 
Litani River.  Also in February 1985, Hezbollah publicly 
announced its existence, vision, and mission in its “open 
letter” and the formation of its military wing- the Islamic 
Resistance.  By June, Israel completed its withdrawal to a 
“security zone.”  The zone’s supposed purpose was to 
establish a geographic buffer upon the northern border of 
Israel, but it still consisted of 10% of Lebanon’s territory 
and provided justification for the continued resistance of 
Hezbollah.54 
The Israeli withdrawal to its security zone created a 
security vacuum.  Palestinian guerrillas began returning to 
refugee camps, and AMAL fought to prevent the PLO’s return.  
Hezbollah supported the PLO for its resistance of Israel and 
as the civil war continued, fought against AMAL for the next 
three years in the “war of the camps.”55   
In February 1988, Hezbollah was accused of kidnapping 
Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, a UN peacekeeper.  This 
kidnapping sparked an open conflict between AMAL and 
Hezbollah which came to be known as the “War for Supremacy 
of South Lebanon.”56  Initially, AMAL cleared Hezbollah from 
south Lebanon, a region which to that date had been largely 
supportive of AMAL.  The fighting spread to the Beirut  
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suburbs, but Hezbollah won these skirmishes, and by the end 
of 1988, Hezbollah had regrouped and re-invaded southern 
Lebanon. 
Syria and Iran ultimately intervened to stop the 
fighting.  Syria had troops occupying Lebanon and the 
ability to militarily destroy Hezbollah.57  Realizing this, 
Hezbollah made the prudent decision to utilize politics and 
diplomacy to convince Syria’s President Assad that Hezbollah 
existed as a resistance force against Israeli occupation, 
and that they did not have an interest in forming “Islamic 
cantons in the South.”58  For this, Hezbollah gained rights 
to return to south Lebanon to continue its war of liberation 
against Israeli occupation. 
The year 1989 proved to be a pivotal one for Hezbollah.  
In January, they signed the “Damascus Agreement” to end their 
war with AMAL.  In June, Ayatollah Khomeini died which 
initiated a swing in Iranian foreign policy that had a large 
impact upon Hezbollah.  Khomeini’s death brought the more 
pragmatic Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani to power and 
influence within Iran.59  Finally, in October of 1989, Lebanon 
ended its fourteen year civil war via the Ta’if Accords.60 
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Hezbollah ultimately became the only sectarian militia 
which did not disarm in accordance with the Ta’if Accords.61  
Hezbollah was allowed to retain their weapons in order to 
continue to serve as a resistance force for Lebanon.62  
During this time period, Hezbollah began to show remarkable 
improvements in its military prowess.63  In 1991, Hezbollah 
improved and decentralized its planning and security during 
operations.64  Through decentralization, Hezbollah enabled 
its subordinate cells to carry out attacks with greater 
autonomy based upon the intent of the Hezbollah leadership 
and the local knowledge of the respective cells.  This led 
to an increased number of attacks over time as Hezbollah 
fighters gained greater experience.  In addition to 
utilizing roadside bombs and suicide car bombers, Hezbollah 
began conducting reconnaissance, and launching extended 
raids and assaults against Israeli positions and strongholds 
in Lebanon while also reducing their casualties through 
greater security and planned withdrawals.65 
In addition to its resistance activities, Hezbollah 
provided services to the populations in their areas as well.  
In the 1980s, Iran and Hezbollah established several social 
welfare-related branches within their organization such as 
the “Relief Committee [RC] of Imam Khomeini” to target the 
Lebanese population with reconstruction and financial aide, 
essential services, and education.66  The oppressed and 
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economically deprived Shia community was viewed by Iran and 
Hezbollah as “fertile ground.”67  This non-military, 
economic, and social focus would assist in securing the 
allegiance of the Shiite population to Hezbollah.  The 
Relief Committee’s creation added to a construction 
organization, Jihad al-Bina’, and the Islamic Health 
Committee (IHC) which both opened in 1984.68  These services 
filled a void left by the inadequate Lebanese government and 
bolstered the popular support that Hezbollah possessed from 
its resistance efforts.69  When Iran’s President Rafsanjani 
mentored Hezbollah to begin to work as part of the Lebanese 
government, Hezbollah’s popular support assisted them in 
winning the largest single party block of seats in Lebanon’s 
1992 parliamentarian elections.70 
E. 1992-2000 
With their decision to work within the Lebanese system, 
Hezbollah secured the ability to apply political pressure 
from within the Lebanese government.71  With this political 
pressure, Hezbollah maintained their right to exist in the 
enclaves that they controlled.72  This enabled Hezbollah to 
continue to spread south, politically and militarily, to 
conduct their social welfare and their construction 
projects, to improve and increase their military proficiency 
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against both their rivals and Israel, and to improve their 
control of the portions of the Lebanese population within 
their enclaves.  Hezbollah was ultimately credited with 
forcing the withdrawal of Israel from their security zone 
and Lebanon in May of 2000.73 
F. HEZBOLLAH’S IRREGULAR TECHNIQUES 
Hezbollah utilized a synergistic strategy to gain 
control of the under-governed enclaves in Lebanon.  
Hezbollah used military, political, social, economic, and 
information operations “primarily aimed at liquidating the 
foreign presence in Lebanon and building an Islamic order in 
its areas of control.”74 
1. Military Techniques 
Militarily, Hezbollah utilized a well disciplined, 
protracted, irregular warfare strategy.  Through the use of 
martyrdom operations and guerrilla warfare, Hezbollah 
focused on forcing the withdrawal of Israeli, U.S., and 
French troops from their areas.75  Additionally, Hezbollah 
attacked internal threats to include the Lebanese Army and 
rival militias for the same purpose.76 
Hezbollah wisely chose to patiently execute a 
protracted struggle against their Western enemies.  
Hezbollah and the IRGC spent three years covertly developing 
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their guerrillas and supporting auxiliary.  From 1982-1985, 
Hezbollah remained covert; content to operate in the shadows 
while they trained and built their organization.77 
Hezbollah grew rapidly because recruits were attracted 
by Iranian financed salaries and benefits that were not only 
enticing to impoverished Shia fighters, but also out bid 
rival militias such as AMAL.78  In fact, the pay of Israel’s 
proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) was indexed 
against Hezbollah fighters’ pay scales.79  In addition to 
their higher pay, Hezbollah guerrillas were offered special 
benefits such as free education and medical treatment for 
both the fighters and their families.80 
Utilizing the sanctuary of the under-governed space of 
the Bekaa Valley, Hezbollah and their Iranian trainers and 
advisors spent a minimum of a year teaching new recruits 
Hezbollah’s ideology and culture.81  During this initial, 
year long “reinforcement” period, Hezbollah assessed their 
recruits, and then selected those fighters who displayed 
appropriate discipline to be party members.82  These 
fighters were then trained for an additional year in martial 
arts, medical support, and weapons.83  Depending upon their 
performance during this two year training period, new 
members were selected for martyrdom operations, “commando or 
special forces” operations, simpler harassment guerrilla 
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operations, or support operations such as surveillance, 
logistics, and medical support.84   Additionally, Hezbollah 
wisely organized their fighters in a cellular fashion so 
that “if one is plucked… the others can’t be discovered 
easily.”85  Hezbollah’s command and control (C2) consisted 
of what can best be described as decentralized C2.  
Hezbollah’s clerical leadership council would reach a 
consensus on a particular action.86  They would then 
delegate their tasking to a regional Islamic scholar within 
a certain district.87  The execution was then left to the 
local cells that, upon receiving guidance, would initiate 
their own reconnaissance and execute their operations based 
upon their situational awareness of their respective local 
areas.88  These operations coupled with Hezbollah’s cellular 
organization ensured operational security and 
compartmentalization.89 
Hezbollah’s initial martyrdom attacks focused upon the 
IDF and the UN troops from the U.S. and France.90  These 
“suicide attacks” are culturally revered by Shia Muslims and 
created disproportionate psychological effects.91  Their 
attacks against the IDF in Tyre, the U.S. embassy, and the 
U.S. and French barracks attrited their enemies’ will.  
Israel withdrew to its “security zone,” and the U.S. and 
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France withdrew their troops completely leaving even larger 
portions of Lebanon under-governed.92 
Hezbollah also fought to clear their areas of other 
Lebanese groups to include the Lebanese Army, AMAL, and 
other rival groups.93  Hezbollah utilized standard guerrilla 
tactics of ambushes and “quick military engagements.”94  In 
1983, the Lebanese Army attempted to establish state 
authority in Hezbollah territory in Baalbeck, but Hezbollah 
fought the Army off and they returned to the safety of their 
barracks.95  Shortly after the arrival of the IRGC, 
Hezbollah staged a demonstration involving women who stormed 
the Army’s Sheikh Abdullah Barracks and evicted the Lebanese 
Army, which did not return until invited by Hezbollah almost 
a decade later.96  In the late 1980s, Hezbollah’s well 
trained and well disciplined fighters fought rival militias, 
especially AMAL’s, to force their competitors out of their 
controlled areas.97 
Hezbollah eventually expanded their controlled areas 
from the Bekaa Valley and Baalbeck down to Beirut’s southern 
suburbs where they established a political headquarters for 
their party in 1984.98  Hezbollah finally established 
control in portions of south Lebanon during their “war of 
the camps” with AMAL in the late 1980s when they defeated 
AMAL fighters in skirmishes and secured their space. 
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Overtime, Hezbollah’s operations became more 
sophisticated and more frequent.99  In addition to simple 
harassment ambushes and roadside bombs, Hezbollah began to 
launch sustained raids into Israeli territory.100  They 
enhanced their reconnaissance and security efforts which 
improved both their force protection and their 
effectiveness.101  From 1985-1989, Hezbollah’s Islamic 
Resistance launched 100 attacks against the IDF.102  From 
1990-1995, during which time Hezbollah ran members for 
Parliament and began to operate with the semi-support of the 
Lebanese state, Hezbollah increased their number of attacks 
to 1,030.103  From 1996-2000, Hezbollah attacked the IDF 
4,928 times which led to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon 
in 2000.104  So, as time passed, Hezbollah learned from its 
past operations and improved their effectiveness, at the 
same time that they substantially increased their guerrilla 
warfare efforts to establish control in their areas.105  
However, during their protracted struggle, Hezbollah also 
gained control through non-military means as well. 
2. Political Techniques 
From the very start of its movement, Hezbollah focused 
on the Shia populations within their enclaves.  Hezbollah 
political tactics assisted in attaining its overall 
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objectives of establishing control of their enclaves, 
defeating the IDF, promoting the rights of the Lebanese Shia 
community, and addressing voids within the Lebanese 
confessional system. 
Hezbollah initiated their political control of their 
three under-governed areas by building upon the networks of 
their Najaf-educated, charismatic, clerical leaders who 
originated from the three geographic areas.106  Hezbollah 
tapped into the social capital of its key leaders to 
establish the necessary roots and inroads into the 
respective populations.  For example, Hezbollah based their 
growth in the Bekaa Valley upon the networks of two of their 
founding members Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi and Sheik al-
Tufayli, Hezbollah’s first secretary general; in Beruit upon 
the networks of Hezbollah’s spiritual guide Sheik Fadlallah 
and Sheik Hassan Nasserallah, their secretary general since 
1992; and finally in south Lebanon upon the networks of the 
martyred Sheik Rageb Harb.107 
As Hezbollah gained political control inside of their 
enclaves, they filled additional voids in governance which 
existed in their controlled areas and enhanced their 
political control by enacting law enforcement and judicial 
mechanisms which the failed Lebanese state could no longer 
provide.  Hezbollah’s “Engagement Unit” provided policing 
functions within their enclaves.108  Hezbollah’s “police” 
maintained order by arresting individuals suspected of 
murder, robbery, and theft in addition to political offenses 
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such as espionage.109  For those arrested for ordinary 
crimes, Hezbollah alternated between turning the accused 
over to the Lebanese government for prosecution and 
adjudicating them within Hezbollah’s “Judicial Unit,” 
depending upon the crime and the political situation 
existing at varying times between Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
government.110 
Hezbollah’s “Judicial Council” consisted of judges and 
judicial officials and provided rulings on their 
constituents’ violations of Sharia Law.111  Hezbollah’s 
judges ruled over civil disputes as well; thus filling a 
shadow government role for their under-governed spaces and 
further subverting the Lebanese government.112 
One of the key attributes of Hezbollah over time was 
its willingness to make use of political mechanisms ranging 
from diplomacy to working within the Lebanese system.  
Hezbollah, despite occasional clashes, maintained a 
turbulent but necessary relationship with Syria.113  During, 
Hezbollah’s infancy, Syria opted to allow Iran to support 
Hezbollah within the Bekaa Valley.114  In addition, during 
the pivotal years of 1989 and 2000, Hezbollah was able to 
deal with Syria to ensure its survival as a resistance group 
despite international pressure.115  Hezbollah’s decision to 
act diplomatically gained it much better results than any it 
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could have achieved by remaining inflexible in its diplomacy 
with its off and on enabler, Syria. 
As noted earlier, Hezbollah faced a watershed year in 
1989 for two significant political reasons.  Domestically, 
the Ta’if Agreement sought to end the Lebanese Civil War and 
internationally, Ayatollah Khomeini died; thus greatly 
impacting the level of political, financial, and military 
support available to Hezbollah.116 
In accordance with its “open letter” manifesto, 
Hezbollah sought to establish an Islamic state, but the 
political reality in Lebanon in 1989 called for a different, 
more pragmatic track.117  Here is where Hezbollah made a 
decision vital to its survival as an organization.  By 
opting to follow a pragmatic course in lieu of its previous 
extremist efforts not to support the Lebanese state, 
Hezbollah enabled itself to remain armed as a recognized 
resistance group.118 
By following Iran’s mandate to participate in the 1992 
parliamentary elections, Hezbollah placed itself within the 
Lebanese system which it shunned for so long, but at the 
same time, provided itself with an opportunity to ensure its 
own survival as a resistance organization when other 
militias were being disarmed across Lebanon.  By working 
within the system, Hezbollah was able to manipulate the 
system to its benefit.119  Hezbollah’s shift from extremism 
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to pragmatism in its politics and diplomacy proved vital to 
its survival and legitimacy, both domestically and 
internationally.120 
3. Social Techniques 
From the beginning of its resistance, Hezbollah focused 
heavily on social mechanisms to improve the daily existence 
of the populations within their controlled areas.121  The 
historic lack of essential services in Shia regions, the 
damage caused by Israeli attacks as well as by factional 
fighting between internal groups such as AMAL, the PLO, and 
Hezbollah, and the collapse of the Lebanese state’s ability 
to provide for its citizens left a huge void for Hezbollah 
and their Iranian supporters to fill.122  These social 
efforts bolstered Hezbollah’s legitimacy with the Lebanese 
population.  These social efforts also helped to offset 
Hezbollah’s loss of legitimacy with portions of the 
population who disliked Hezbollah for their extremist 
Islamic governance of their areas or the harsh treatment 
which the Shia of southern Lebanon suffered due to the 
Israeli punishment tactics against Lebanese citizens for 
their support of Hezbollah and other resistance 
organizations.123 
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In 1988, Hezbollah established its Holy Struggle 
Construction Foundation, also known as Jihad al-Bina’.124  
Hezbollah built and repaired homes, shops, hospitals, 
infirmaries, mosques, and cultural centers in its controlled 
areas of Bekaa, the south Beirut suburbs, and southern 
Lebanon.125  They provided electricity, paved roads, managed 
sewage systems, collected garbage, dug wells, and trucked in 
water to the needy.126 
Hezbollah also built and repaired schools in their 
controlled areas.127  Hezbollah viewed illiteracy and 
ignorance as one of the causes of the lack of social and 
political progress in Lebanon.128  Hezbollah used its 
construction assets to build and refurbish schools in remote 
villages and towns.  Between 1988 and 1994, Hezbollah’s 
construction department refurbished twenty-four schools in 
the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon.129  Lebanon does not 
have free education, but Hezbollah provided reduced rates, 
education subsidies for the poor, and provided something 
that the Lebanese government could not.130 
Hezbollah provided outstanding medical support to the 
Lebanese in their areas.  Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Unit 
operated pharmacies, medical and dental clinics, and even 
hospitals in support of their fighters and their 
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constituents in their controlled areas.131  Hezbollah 
constructed two hospitals, in Baalbeck and in Beirut’s 
southern suburbs, and operated medical clinics dispersed 
throughout their controlled areas.132  In addition, 
Hezbollah deployed mobile clinics to villages located along 
the border of Israel’s security zone providing medical 
coverage to civilians who did not want to travel frequently 
for fear of being caught in the fighting in that dangerous 
area.133  All of these services stood in contrast to the 
lack of support provided by the Lebanese government, the 
IDF, or groups such as AMAL, who provided support, but less 
than that provided by Hezbollah.134 
In all, Hezbollah’s social mechanisms in areas such as 
construction, education, and medical services focused on the 
populations in their enclaves and provided government –like 
services that the Lebanese State, the IDF, and rivals such 
as AMAL, could not or would not provide. 
4. Economic Techniques 
“The Lebanese government was happy to let Hezbollah 
take responsibility for the Shiites’ welfare.”135  Hezbollah 
and its external supporter, Iran, saw an opportunity to fill 
yet another void left by the failed Lebanese government and 
exploited this opportunity by channeling millions of dollars 
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of aid and financial assistance into a robust social welfare 
system for the Shia population.136  In 1987, Ayatollah 
Khomeini launched a social welfare program within Lebanon.  
“In a clear reprimand to Israel and the West, Khomeini hoped 
that the organization ‘would alleviate the pain of the 
Lebanese oppressed” who had suffered from Israeli occupation 
and the Lebanese Civil War.137  
In addition to Iranian funds, Hezbollah also collected 
money domestically through zakat and khoms, which are 
religious taxes on assets and income.138  Hezbollah also ran 
collection boxes in their neighborhoods.139  Hezbollah 
provided home and small business loans.  Hezbollah 
established a Martyrs Foundation to care for the families of 
it deceased fighters.140  This likely provided psychological 
benefits to its fighters to know that their families would 
be provided for upon their death in martyrdom or guerrilla 
operations. 
The social and economic mechanisms which Hezbollah 
chose to employ simultaneously with its military operations 
built a lasting loyalty for the group within the Shia 
community.141  A survey from 1993 suggested that Hezbollah 
possessed support within their controlled areas based upon 
their available funds and “tight organization” which 
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“permitted a wide distribution of benefits.”142  The study 
went on to predict that when compared to resource provision 
levels from the Lebanese government and AMAL, Hezbollah’s 
programs would “continue to facilitate Islamist penetration 
of the domains of other power contenders and [would] permit 
the Party of God to woo the considerable uncommitted portion 
of the Shiite community.”143  This trust, built upon a 
decade of support, added to Hezbollah’s legitimacy. 
5. Informational Techniques 
Hezbollah furthered its legitimacy, influence, and 
control in its enclaves and throughout greater Lebanon and 
the Levant through its use of information operations such as 
public affairs and propaganda.  Initially, Hezbollah spread 
its influence and gained support and resources through its 
grass roots interaction with the Shia population.  As time 
passed, Hezbollah’s use of the media played an integral part 
in its resistance of Israel’s occupation and its more 
permanent legitimacy within the Lebanese system.144 
As Hezbollah organized and fought to gain control of 
its enclaves from 1982 to 1992, Hezbollah used word of mouth 
to influence target populations.  One of Hezbollah’s 
strengths in the information realm came from its clerical 
leadership who by the nature of their occupation had oratory 
and written skills.  Much of the original clandestine 
recruitment and propaganda appears to have taken place in 
mosques and in Husseiniyahs, which are Shiite social and 
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religious centers, during sermons and secret meetings.145  
This would mimic the conditions under which many of 
Hezbollah’s lead clerics received their training alongside 
religious leaders such as Ayatollah Khomeini in religious 
centers such as Najaf, Iraq and Qom, Iran in the 1970s.146 
Hezbollah also used media to spread its influence.  In 
1984, Hezbollah launched a weekly newspaper, Al-Ahed.  In 
1985, Hezbollah decided to publicly announce its existence 
via its “open letter.”147  In this document, Hezbollah laid 
out its ideology in an effort to gain legitimacy and 
support.  During the “war of the camps” in the late 1980s, 
Hezbollah launched, Al-Nour, its radio station.148  In 1991, 
Hezbollah launched Al-Manar, which aired news bulletins, 
political commentaries, and footage of resistance activities 
aimed to bolster the morale of the Lebanese and attrit the 
morale of the Israelis.149 
Through its use of local, grass roots, interpersonal 
interaction with its target populations and its use of 
multi-media public affairs, Hezbollah greatly enhanced its 
stature both domestically with its constituents and 
internationally within the greater Arab community. 
G. TECHNIQUES TO AVOID 
Hezbollah successfully established control of under-
governed spaces within Lebanon and provided Israel its first 
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military defeat while at the same time politically, 
socially, and economically bolstering its supporting 
population.  Unfortunately, Hezbollah also performed or 
enabled the performance of acts which many in the 
international community viewed as illegitimate terrorist 
attacks.  Accusations of suicide bombing, hostage-taking, 
and hi-jacking of airplanes have kept Hezbollah labeled as a 
terrorist organization for over two decades, and no matter 
how much money Hezbollah raises and donates to the needy 
within their controlled areas, they will not shake the 
negative association of those terrorist acts within portions 
of the greater international community.150  Hezbollah also 
lost legitimacy in the mid-1980s when it attempted to 
enforce Islamic order and practice the Sharia within its 
controlled areas.151  Upon arriving in the South, Hezbollah 
banned the sale of alcohol in shops and restaurants and 
prohibited parties, dancing, and loud music.152  This 
extremism only served to further the economic isolation of 
southern Lebanon because it hurt tourism and commerce in the 
area.153 
As Hezbollah learned and evolved in its operations 
between 1982 and 2002, it distanced itself from politically 
unpopular terrorist activities and attempted to follow 
“rules of the game” where Hezbollah consciously attempted to 
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target only Israeli soldiers and their proxy Christian 
militiamen and to avoid civilian casualties.154  Though 
Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel in tit-
for-tat responses to attacks on their civilian populations, 
Hezbollah proved much more successful at avoiding causing 
civilian casualties than the heavier handed IDF.155 
Hezbollah also became more sensitive to their 
constituents over time and loosened their strict Islamic 
governance of their controlled areas by allowing more 
liberal clothing wear and limiting the amount of religious 
instruction in its schools while focusing on secular topics 
such as math, sciences, and foreign languages (to include 
English).156 
H. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 
Over the span of 18 years, Hezbollah rose from a small 
group of obscure clerics to a force which overwhelmed rival 
factions and Israeli Defense Forces to gain control of their 
under-governed enclaves and force the withdrawal of Western 
forces from Lebanon.  Through elections, members of 
Hezbollah’s political wing became a part of the Lebanese 
state.  However, Hezbollah did not do all of this alone.  
They had help from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or 
IRGC.  The techniques used by the IRGC to influence and 
control Hezbollah provide examples of tactics, techniques, 
and procedures for operating by, with, and through irregular 
forces. 
                     
154 Norton, 2007, 83-88; Norton, 2000, 29-30. 
155 Norton, 2007, 83-88; Norton, 2000, 29-30. 
156 Ziad Hashem, Lebanese Army Officer, in discussions with the 
author on 12 May 2007 in Monterey, California. 
 41
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps originated as a 
non-clerical militia tasked to consolidate Khomeini’s 
Islamic Revolution in 1979.157  The IRGC soon expanded its 
organization to include military tasks carried out initially 
in support of the Iran-Iraq War and irregular warfare tasks 
aimed at conducting unconventional warfare to export the 
Islamic Revolution.158  Shortly after the IDF invaded 
Lebanon, the IRGC deployed elements of its Pasdaran into a 
base in Zebdani, Syria and up to 1,500 military trainers, 
advisors, and clerical propaganda specialists into the Bekaa 
Valley.159  The IRGC and its surrogates turned the sanctuary 
of the Bekaa Valley into “a no-man’s-land, cut off from the 
rest of the country.  It… turned into a miniature Iranian 
republic, where the doctrine of the Guards, Khomeini and 
Shiite clerics reigned.”160 
The IRGC utilized a protracted and indirect approach 
inside of Lebanon by focusing their efforts towards 
organizing, training, and equipping Hezbollah guerrillas 
over the course of the next decade rather than leading them 
in guerrilla warfare against the IDF, rival militias, and 
the Lebanese government.161  Additionally, some elite 
elements of Hezbollah were reportedly exfiltrated to Iran to 
attend Islamic revolutionary training camps.162 
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In addition to the military training of the IRGC, 
imported Iranian clerics went door to door within 
Hezbollah’s controlled areas proselytizing about Islamic 
tenets and the teachings and doctrines of Khomeini to local 
villagers.163  The clerics utilized their propaganda to 
build legitimacy and gain recruits for Hezbollah. 
Finally, the IRGC utilized many of the same techniques 
that it used to consolidate control and gain legitimacy for 
Khomeini’s regime inside Iran after their revolution.  As 
the IRGC consolidated control within Iran after the 
revolution, it not only established physical control of the 
Iranian population, but also sought to shore up support and 
build legitimacy through the use of social and economic 
foundations.164  These foundations provided social welfare, 
redistributed land, and extended the regime’s authority into 
rural areas by building rural infrastructure and providing 
economic support to Iranian peasants and the urban lower 
class.165 
The IRGC advisors exported these non-military 
techniques to Lebanon where they gained support and recruits 
for Hezbollah and the IRGC by “establishing schools, 
hospitals, mosques, and welfare organizations” inside 
Hezbollah’s controlled areas.166  The IRGC also used 
substantial Iranian funds to support Hezbollah cash 
subsidies for the poor in their enclaves.167  These non-
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military strategies helped to overcome the costs of imposing 
strict Islamic rules upon the population within Hezbollah’s 
controlled areas.  Despite the distaste felt by more secular 
portions of the population, the support aimed at the 
population provided a genuine help to the oppressed Lebanese 
Shia and rural and urban poor. 
Over the course of a decade, the IRGC provided military 
training and support coupled with political, social, 
economic, and informational support to Hezbollah’s fighters 
and their surrounding populations.  This protracted and 
indirect strategy provided integral assistance to Hezbollah 
and ultimately led to the withdrawal of Israeli Defense 
Forces and the IDF’s proxy militia, as well as the long-term 
political control and legitimacy of Hezbollah’s irregular 
forces within under-governed spaces in Lebanon. 
I. CONCLUSION 
When the Lebanese Civil War led to the collapse of the 
Lebanese state in 1975, and Israel occupied Lebanon in order 
to disrupt PLO attacks, Hezbollah established control of 
under-governed spaces in the Bekaa Valley, the southern 
suburbs of Beirut, and in parts of south Lebanon.  To do so, 
Hezbollah chose to pursue a protracted, irregular warfare 
strategy which involved not only synergistic combinations of 
military, social, economic, political, and informational 
techniques, but additionally a display of astute pragmatism, 






with its environment and become increasingly more effective 
over time in support of its target populations and in combat 
against its enemies.168 
The Iranian Republican Guard Corps proved that a 
protracted and indirect strategy of sustained, long-term 
military training, advice, and support of irregular 
surrogates when coupled with liberal amounts of political, 
informational, social, and economic mechanisms can 
facilitate both the needs of surrogates and those of their 
external supporters. 
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III. RISE OF THE TALIBAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, the Taliban rose from the lawless environs of 
southern Afghanistan to become the central authority inside 
Afghanistan until their defeat by the Northern Alliance and 
their U.S. sponsors in the fall of 2001.169  The Taliban 
utilized relatively conventional military operations, along 
with rudimentary social, economic, political, and 
informational methods to seize control of under-governed 
space throughout 90% of Afghanistan.170  The Taliban 
received training, advice, and support from Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which served both the 
Taliban’s and Pakistan’s needs.171  Therefore, this case 
study can provide examples of irregular techniques for 
controlling under-governed space as well as tactics, 
techniques, and procedures for operating by, with, and 
through irregular forces.  In order to fully understand the 
rise of the Taliban one must appreciate the contemporary 
history of Afghanistan. 
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B. AFGHANISTAN’S COLLAPSE 
Fourteen years of Soviet occupation and Afghan civil 
war decimated the state of Afghanistan.  In April of 1992, 
Mujahideen resistance parties took partial control of 
Afghanistan; however, the government formed by the 
Mujahideen failed to stabilize the country.  Tajik and Uzbek 
forces under Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and 
Rashid Dostum seized power which almost immediately fomented 
a subsequent civil war from Pashtun parties who had 
traditionally ruled Afghanistan.172  The civil warfare 
between 1992 and 1994 “eventually wreaked as much if not 
more damage and destruction on the country than the Soviet 
invasion and occupation.”173 
By summer of 1994, the government of Afghanistan had 
disintegrated.  The state was divided into fiefdoms where 
warlords formed and betrayed alliances as they fought for 
control of Afghanistan and its resources.174  Prior to the 
rise of the Taliban, the Tajik party of Jamiyat-i Islami of 
President Rabbani and General Massoud controlled Kabul and 
largely Tajik areas to the northeast through the Panshir 
Valley to Kunduz.  Rabbani’s government was the 
internationally recognized government of Afghanistan, but 
did not have effective political control beyond Jamiyat’s 
controlled areas.  Throughout the remainder of the state, 
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various warlords and former Mujahideen parties controlled 
different areas where they provided varying degrees of 
security and governance to the populations in their 
respective areas.175  Rashid Dostum’s Uzbek Jombesh-I Melli 
controlled northern areas of the country.  The Hazaran party 
of Hezb-i Wahdat held a foothold in Kabul and controlled the 
central Hazarajat region west of the Hindu Kush.  The 
warlord Ismail Khan controlled the western portion of the 
state centered on Herat.  In the east on the Pakistan 
border, an independent shura (council) controlled three 
Pashtun provinces centered on Jalabad, and Gulbuddin 
Hikmetyar’s fighters in Hezb-i Islami controlled a small 
region to the south and east of Kabul.176  Finally, in the 
south around Qandahar, internecine fighting between local 
warlords had created a region of lawlessness where opium 
production, extortion, rape, and murder resulted from the 
chronic insecurity.177  In sum, Afghanistan clearly met the 
definition of under-governed space with an absence of a 
central government able to politically control its 
population and the presence of lawlessness, insurgency, and 
irregular non-state actors.  The situation would change with 
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C. THE TALIBAN 
During the mid-19th century in British India, the 
Deobandi religious movement arose to “reform and unite 
Muslim society as it struggled to live within the confines 
of a colonial state ruled by non-Muslims.”178  Education was 
viewed as a key in the spread of this movement and the 
Deobandis set up madrassahs (religious schools) throughout 
British India; Afghans arrived to study as well.179  
Deobandi madrassahs developed extremely fast in Pakistan 
upon its creation in 1947.180  The Deobandis created the 
Jamiat-e-Ulema (JUI) movement to mobilize their followers 
and in 1962, the JUI became a political party inside of 
Pakistan.181  Through the years of the Soviet Afghan War, 
the JUI set up hundreds of madrassahs in the Pashtun belt in 
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan.182  
These schools offered young Pakistanis and Afghan refugees 
free education, food, shelter, and military training, and by 
the early 1990s, had trained a whole generation of Afghan 
youth for the post-Soviet period.183  Additionally, Pakistan 
had funded madrassahs of all sectarian persuasions and by 
1988 “there were 8,000 madrassahs and 25,000 unregistered 
ones, educating over half a million students.”184 
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The Taliban rose from these roots.  The Taliban 
leadership had been educated under the Deobandi ideology; 
many in JUI sponsored madrassahs.  The Taliban originated 
from the Jamiyat-i Taliban, a subsidiary of the Mujahideen 
political party Harakat-i Enqelab, where they formed ties 
with Pakistan’s ISI.185  When Enqelab later collapsed, the 
Taliban maintained their links with the JUI in Pakistan and 
access to soldiers from the madrassah students of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.186 
By 1994, the conditions were set for an irregular force 
to begin to seize control of the under-governed spaces in 
Afghanistan.  The Taliban intended to “restore peace, disarm 
the population, enforce Sharia law, and defend the integrity 
and Islamic character of Afghanistan.”187 
D. 1994-1998 
Though the precise order remains unclear, several key 
events have entered the history books as initial components 
of the rise of the Taliban.188  In the spring of 1994, at 
the bequest of his neighbors, Mullah Omar is reported to 
have enlisted 30 of his talibs to rescue two local girls 
held captive by a local warlord, and to have seized arms and 
ammunition.189  Several months later, Omar and the Taliban 
are reported to have freed a young boy being fought over by 
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two more local commanders.190  The Taliban then reportedly 
received additional requests for assistance to provide order 
around Qandahar; and the Taliban began to grow in 
numbers.191 
Meanwhile, after supporting the extremist Gulbiddin 
Hekmatyar and his Pashtun Hezbi-i Islami party since the 
Soviet Afghan War and not meeting its goals, Pakistan 
changed its foreign policy.  In an attempt to open a trade 
route from Pakistan through Qandahar and Herat to 
Turkmenistan, Pakistan’s new Minister of the Interior, 
General Nasrullah Babar, a Pashtun, employed the Taliban, 
whom he had established links with through the JUI, the ISI, 
and his time in the 1970s as the Governor of the NWFP, to 
assist him.192 
The Taliban successfully attacked the frontier outpost 
of Spin Boldak along the Quetta-Qandahar road and seized an 
enormous arms depot including 18,000 small arms as well as 
ammunition and heavy weapons enabling the Taliban to arm 
large numbers of fighters.193  Next, Pakistan reportedly 
attempted to transit a large 30 vehicle convoy loaded with 
medicine, consumer goods, and food from Quetta through 
Qandahar and Herat to Turkmenistan.194  The convoy was 
halted on the outskirts of Qandahar by local warlords who 
demanded payment to pass through their areas.  Two ISI 
officers and two Taliban commanders were on board the 
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convoy, and the Taliban were called for assistance.195  
Taliban reinforcements freed the convoy in early November, 
and over the next two days, seized the city of Qandahar and 
the nearby airport where they gained control of fighter 
planes and transport helicopters.196 
The Taliban then cleared the roads of check points from 
Qandahar to the border and began charging a single toll from 
transporters traveling through their area.197  Meanwhile, 
thousands of Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun volunteers from 
Pakistani JUI madrassahs rushed to Qandahar to become 
members of the new Islamic movement in Afghanistan, and by 
December 1994, 12,000 students had joined the Taliban.198 
In 1995, the Taliban, with the support and advice of 
the ISI, began to seize control of Afghan provinces on two 
fronts.  They fought towards Kabul to the north and Herat to 
the west.  The Taliban had shifted from a provincial force, 
establishing security in and around Qandahar, to a regional 
force attempting to impose Sharia law and disarm Mujahideen 
‘criminals’ across Afghanistan.199 
The Taliban were able to rapidly gain control of areas 
in the Pashtun dominated south, as they used their ISI 
supported military prowess, existing social and religious 
networks, and subversion to their advantage.  With each of 
these victories, the Taliban seized increasing amounts of  
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weapons, tanks, and equipment while swelling their numbers 
with “re-flagged” soldiers and additional madrassah 
students. 
The Taliban finally began to meet significant 
resistance upon reaching the borders of the heavily Pashtun 
populated areas.  This increased resistance occurred in part 
due to the distinct cultural fault lines that existed 
between the Pashtun south and the remainder of the Afghan 
population who feared Pashtun domination.  The Taliban 
fought and defeated Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami militia who 
were arrayed in a wide arc south of Kabul where they had 
been fighting for control of Kabul against Rabbani and 
Massoud.  The Taliban then opened the road to Kabul allowing 
food convoys to reach the capital city after months of 
blockade imposed by Hekmatyar.200  This was a popular step 
which raised the Taliban’s prestige with Kabul’s skeptical 
citizens and provided the Taliban additional support from 
the truck transport mafia who transited goods out of 
Pakistan.201 
Outside Kabul, the Taliban faced a three-way stand off 
with the Hazarans of Hezb-i Wahdat and Massoud’s government 
forces.202  The Taliban attempted to negotiate with both 
entities, but Massoud ultimately attacked Hezb-i Wahdat 
forces; Hezb-i Wahdat forces attacked the Taliban; and then 
the government attacked the Taliban.203  The battle-hardened 
government fighters of Ahmed Shah Massoud were able to push 
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both the Hazaran and the Taliban militias out of rocket 
range of Kabul; handing the Taliban their first major 
setback and leaving Massoud in complete control of Kabul for 
the first time.204 
To the west, the Taliban made significant gains.205  
Despite doubts from the ISI, the Taliban leaders opted to 
exploit gains in the west to offset their failures around 
Kabul.206  The Taliban used maneuver warfare and subversion 
to advance towards Herat and Ismail Khan.207  Meanwhile 
Rashid Dostum also attacked Khan’s area from the north east, 
and in response, the Afghan government shipped 2,000 troops 
west to reinforce Khan.208  Heavy conventional warfare 
followed.209  Hindered by poor logistics and ammunition 
shortages, the irregular forces of the Taliban met with 
their second significant defeat and lost substantial ground 
to Khan and the government.210 
After successive large scale military defeats on two 
fronts, many people thought that the Taliban were finished 
as an irregular force.211  However, the covert support of 
the ISI in the form of cash, military spare parts, and 
training in technical skills from former Afghan Communist 
Army Officers, along with tens of thousands of 
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reinforcements from Pakistan, strengthened the Taliban over 
the summer of 1995 during a lull in fighting.212 
In August of 1995, Khan launched an attack against the 
Taliban, but was badly beaten by the student army who were 
now re-trained, advised, and logistically supported by the 
ISI.213  The Taliban had suddenly shifted to coordinated 
maneuver warfare in a matter of months; defeating Ismail 
Khan’s fighters and seizing Shindand Airfield and Herat by 
early September.  The counterattack by the Taliban was seen 
as the turning point of the war and the beginning of the end 
for the Rabbani government.214 
The Taliban now controlled an area for the first time 
that was not predominantly Pashtun.  They closed all of the 
schools, “forcibly implemented their social bans and Sharia 
law,” and handed the administration of the city over to 
Pashtun administrators who did not speak the local Persian 
language.215  But, the Taliban opened the Qandahar road 
benefiting the economy, possessed a key air base, and now 
faced only a one front war.216  At the end of 1995, the 
Taliban attacked towards Kabul again.  However, they failed 
to take the capital and frontlines formed in a stalemate 
through the winter. 
In the spring of 1996, the Taliban held a shura of 
1,200 religious leaders to discuss Taliban policy.217  The 
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Taliban had grown to an extent that it experienced riffs 
internally.  To counter this, the shura nominated Mullah 
Mohammad Omar as Amir-ul Momineen (Commander of the 
Faithful).218  This made Omar the supreme leader of the 
Taliban, and he cemented his control by donning the sacred 
“Cloak of the Prophet” which gave him religious 
legitimacy.219 
As the summer of 1996 passed with the Taliban still 
stalemated outside Kabul, other warlords such as Hekmatyar 
and Dostum began to cooperate with the government.  With 
this cooperation came pressure on Massoud to extend his 
lines out of Kabul to assist Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami 
elements.  Like Hekmatyar before them, the Taliban 
terrorized Kabul with indiscriminate rocket and artillery 
fire.  At the same time, the ISI, with financial backing 
from Saudi Arabia, provided the support needed by the 
Taliban to break their stalemate. 
The Taliban attacked east using their potent 
combination of military attack and subversive bribes to 
seize Jalalabad.220  The Taliban, advised and supported by 
the ISI, were then able to press their advantage.  They 
captured Bagram Airfield next and began to approach Kabul 
rapidly over multiple avenues of approach, again utilizing 
coordinated maneuver warfare.221  Massoud, unable to stop  
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the Taliban assault, conducted a holding action and 
evacuated his forces from Kabul on the night of September 
26, 1996.222 
“Within 24 hours of taking Kabul, the Taliban imposed 
the strictest Islamic system in place anywhere in the 
world.”223  The Taliban banned TV, videos, music, satellite 
dishes, sports, and even kite flying.224  The Taliban 
renamed Radio Kabul to Radio Shariat and took all music off 
the air.225  Taliban soldiers stood on main streets 
enforcing their extreme social standards on male beard 
length and female dress.226  Unlike Herat and Qandahar, 
Kabul contained a large international press corps who 
publicized the Taliban restrictions.227 
The Taliban established a Kabul shura which contained 
no Kabulis and no one capable of administering a major city 
or a national government.228  The Afghan Ministries were in 
Kabul, yet Mullah Omar governed from Qandahar with 
associated inefficiencies.  On October 10, 1996, the non-
Taliban parties of Jamiyat, Hezb-i Wahdat, and Jombesh 
formed an alliance named the United Islamic Front that would 
continue the civil war.229  After capturing Kabul, the 
Taliban continued to pursue their opponents into non-Pashtun  
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areas, and for the remainder of the decade control of 
varying portions of north eastern Afghanistan changed hands 
repeatedly.230 
In 1997, Dostum attempted to defend Mazar-i Sharif, but 
was subverted when his second in command turned on him, and 
the Taliban took control of the city.231  The Taliban once 
again tried to establish their coercive style of control in 
a relatively modern city which had not experienced warfare 
to the extent that many of the other cities in Afghanistan 
had.232  The Taliban vanguard that captured the city then 
attempted to disarm the Hazarans in Mazar-i Sharif and 
sparked a revolt.  The Taliban, lacking an in depth 
situational awareness of their environs, lost 3,000 soldiers 
who were trapped in the city and killed.233 
The Taliban finally gained control of Mazar-i Sharif in 
August 1998, and thus controlled all of the large political 
centers of Afghanistan and all of the major commerce routes.  
By this time, the Taliban had also formed rudimentary 
government ministries and met with the United Nations.  
Despite all of this, the Taliban government was only 
recognized diplomatically by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates due to their extreme governance. 
E. 1998-2001 
The Taliban and Massoud’s United Islamic Front 
continued to fight their civil war until U.S. intervention 
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in the fall of 2001.  The Taliban were able to consolidate 
the areas under their control and perform rudimentary 
governmental tasks, but they were unable to defeat Massoud 
who had fallen back upon his home turf in the Panshir Valley 
and its surrounding mountains.234   
Despite predictions by the international community that 
the Taliban would eventually “mature into a Saudi-like 
moderate Islamic government,” Mullah Omar fell under the 
influence of Osama Bin Laden and became more and more 
extreme in his actions.235  Omar’s and the Taliban’s 
devotion ultimately cost them their government when their 
Al-Qaeda guests used their Taliban provided sanctuary to 
plan the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
F. TALIBAN’S IRREGULAR TECHNIQUES 
The Taliban gained political control of 90% of 
Afghanistan to include all keys areas of political and 
economic power through largely conventional military 
operations against their enemies.236  Upon establishing 
control of an area, the Taliban provided security to the 
population, opened trade routes, and installed local 
government, but their social actions found legitimacy in 
rural Pashtun areas only.  The Taliban’s use of myths and 
the external support that the Taliban received from Pakistan 
proved integral to their successes.237 
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1. Military Techniques 
Militarily, the Taliban gained control of under-
governed space through enemy-focused operations involving 
conventional warfare against state and non-state actors, a 
large reserve of soldiers, the use of madrassahs and 
training camps, and the use of political warfare such as 
subversion and targeted assassinations.  Despite their 
relatively rapid maneuver capabilities, they were hindered 
at times by a lack of logistics.   
By 1992, Afghan warfare had transformed to a more 
conventional form involving mass, maneuver, and firepower 
focused on destroying an opponent’s military forces.238  The 
Soviet retreat left Afghan militias with abundant amounts of 
heavy weapons.  The various factions changed their tactics 
from those historically based on harassment guerrilla 
strikes to those involving adversaries massed on actual 
front lines as they engaged each other with heavy weapons, 
armor, and artillery. 
The Taliban were able to make an additional leap to 
conduct coordinated maneuver warfare; a vast change made 
possible by the assistance from the ISI which will be 
expanded upon below.239  The Taliban fought three different 
campaigns, in Herat, Kabul, and Mazar-i Sharif, where they 
attacked their opponents using rapid fire and maneuver.  At 
their pinnacle, these campaigns included night operations; 
repeated attacks despite heavy casualties; well coordinated 
command, control, and logistics; and capable employment of 
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aviation, armor, and artillery assets in support of 30,000-
35,000 troops functioning in brigade and division 
structure.240  Their state opponents, to include Ismail 
Khan, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and Rashid Dostum, were veteran 
war fighters who were unable to resist the Taliban attacks 
that occurred with speed and audacity across multiple 
avenues of approach.241 
In addition to their fight with the Rabbani 
government’s military forces, the Taliban also attacked and 
defeated the irregular forces of Gulbiddin Hekmatyar.  
Hekmatyar and his Hezb-i Islami soldiers had fought 
Massoud’s militia forces from a position outside of Kabul 
since the fall of the Afghan communist government.  
Hekmatyar shelled Kabul barbarically for several years, but 
Massoud had been unable to attack and defeat him due to 
multiple factors to include the presence of Hezb-i Wahdat 
and Jombesh forces threatening Massoud’s lines around Kabul 
as well.  Conversely, the Taliban were able to attack and 
severely disrupt Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami forces during 
their effort to establish control over the under-governed 
spaces in Afghanistan.242  The Taliban cut Hezb-i Islami off 
from their previous Pakistani support and sent Hekmatyar’s 
forces “in full flight before the Taliban advance.”243   
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Hence, in their fight for control of under-governed space in 
Afghanistan, the Taliban militarily defeated both state and 
non-state actors. 
As the Taliban gained control of Afghanistan from 1994 
through 2000, they benefited from extraordinarily deep 
reserves.  The Taliban received additional manpower from 
several areas.  First, the Taliban repeatedly received 
thousands of recruits from their JUI madrassah network.244  
When the pool of volunteers ran low, madrassahs were shut 
down to send talibs forward as reinforcements.245  Second, 
the Taliban gained mass from “re-flagged” Taliban.  When 
opposing commanders surrendered or joined the Taliban, their 
fighters often joined the Taliban as well.246  Third, the 
Taliban resorted to conscripting young men.  For example, 
the Taliban entered mosques in Kabul in the fall of 1996 and 
seized worshippers to send forward to fight against 
Massoud.247  Finally, the Taliban benefited from outsiders 
such as former Afghan communists from the Khalq Party who 
joined the Taliban through contacts in the ISI.248 
Many of the Taliban gained their ideology and martial 
prowess in madrassahs and training camps, funded and 
operated by Pakistan’s JUI and ISI, where they were prepared 
psychologically and militarily.  Taliban madrassahs, located 
across the Pashtun tribal belt, had invested years towards 
instilling the Taliban ideology into tens of thousands of 
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young men preparing them for jihad.249  The Taliban used JUI 
and ISI run training camps in both Pakistan and Afghanistan 
to train their fighters.  For example, in January 1995, 
training camps were established at Spin Boldak and Qandahar 
where recruits from Pakistani madrassahs were trained in 
courses lasting two months.250  At other times the Taliban 
sent raw recruits straight to the front lines, but during 
lulls in fighting and after major defeats, the Taliban 
utilized training camps to enhance their soldiers’ 
skills.251 
Though the irregular forces of the Taliban used 
conventional styles of warfare, they conducted political 
warfare as well.  The Taliban used social networks, 
subversion, and even assassination against their opponents.  
First, the Taliban leadership used the religious and social 
networks that they had developed over the past 15 years to 
extend “feelers” to persuade certain opponents to forego 
resistance against the Taliban.252  This technique assisted 
the Taliban in establishing control of Uruzgan and Zabul 
provinces “with scarcely a shot fired.”253 
Second, the Taliban and the ISI used subversion 
throughout their campaigns to gain an advantage over their 
enemies or to avoid fighting altogether.254  For example, a 
key maneuver by the ISI and the Taliban occurred early in 
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the Taliban’s existence.  While the Taliban still numbered 
in the hundreds, an ISI agent is reported to have bribed the 
prominent commander in Qandahar to not resist.255  Mullah 
Naquib commanded 2,500 men, but surrendered to the Taliban 
for a “substantial bribe” and “the promise that he would 
retain his command.”256  The Taliban then enlisted his men 
and persuaded Naquib to leave Qandahar for his home district 
two months later.257  The Taliban also subverted Rashid 
Dostum during their campaign to capture control of Mazar-i 
Sharif when they turned Dostum’s deputy, Abdul Malik, in May 
of 1997. 258  Malik sought revenge for Dostum assassinating 
Malik’s brother the previous year.259  Malik’s decision-
making was assisted by Taliban bribes.260 
Third, the Taliban used assassination to consolidate 
their power and control.261  The Taliban assassinated Abdul 
Ahad Khan Karzai, the leader of the famous Popalzai tribe 
and father of future Afghan President Hamid Karzai, in 
Quetta in July 1999.  The Taliban also massacred the family 
of former Mujahideen commander and Taliban rival Abdul Haq 
in the spring of 1999.  Through targeted persuasion, bribes, 
subversion, and killings, the Taliban were able to eliminate 
threats to their political control. 
Despite many sound military techniques, the Taliban did 
suffer difficulties as well.  Although the Taliban made a 
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quantum leap in military capabilities and achieved stunning 
victories over their rivals, they were hindered at times by 
their lack of logistics.  With the help of the ISI, the 
Taliban repeatedly overwhelmed their enemies in battle, but 
they also met defeat due to outrunning their logistics.  As 
an example, in 1995, while attempting to capture Herat and 
defeat Ismael Khan, the Taliban overextended their lines; 
ran short of water, food, and ammunition; and met defeat.262  
They also lacked medical facilities and left hundreds of 
wounded Taliban to die in the desert.263  Addressing these 
logistical weaknesses represented one of the key 
capabilities offered by the external support of the ISI.  
Upon militarily defeating their opponents, the Taliban then 
had to maintain control of their under-governed spaces.  To 
do so, the Taliban turned to non-military mechanisms. 
2. Political Techniques 
Through a political structure that changed over time, 
the Taliban established political control in their areas 
that was based upon the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar 
and the Taliban interpretation of Islamic governance.  The 
Taliban used police and coercion in cities and towns, but 
relied more upon local consensus in outlying areas. 
Prior to 1994, a social network existed amongst Mullah 
Omar and other religious leaders who had trained under 
Deobandi influence in madrassahs in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  This network had connections to, and was 
influenced by, both the Pakistani political party of JUI and 
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agents of the Pakistani ISI, who had connected with the 
Taliban leadership during the Afghan Soviet war.264 
As the Taliban organized in 1994 and began to seize 
control of space inside southern Afghanistan, the Taliban 
formed under the leadership of Mullah Omar and the guidance 
of a 10 member “supreme” shura and a military shura both 
based in Qandahar.265  By 1995, after the capture of Herat, 
the shura was expanded from 35 to 100.266 
Mullah Mohammad Omar was “elected” by a large shura, 
consisting of over 1,200 religious leaders, in spring 1996.  
His election was believed to be based upon the will of Allah 
rather than for Omar’s religious knowledge.267  With the 
capture of Kabul and the consolidation of the military 
situation, a more elaborate political structure was 
formed.268 
The Taliban formed the Kabul shura under Mullah Rabbani 
while maintaining a parallel structure in Qandahar.269  The 
Kabul shura became the ministers of the Taliban government 
with Mullah Rabbani270 serving as the equivalent of a prime 
minister or head of government, while the parallel shura in  
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Qandahar, reduced back to 10 members, served as Omar’s 
entourage and sometimes as co-members in the Kabul shura as 
well.271 
The Taliban initially lacked sufficient numbers to 
occupy the countryside in depth and controlled only towns 
and main roads.272  For example, in Logar and Ghazni 
provinces, Taliban ulema from Qandahar took over the posts 
of district officials (uluswal), leaving the rest of the 
district administration in place.273  With time, the Taliban 
continued to centralize and set up a local administrative 
system in areas that they controlled by appointing 
provincial governors and administrators of districts and 
cities.274  The Taliban placed their uluswals in charge of 
security and moral enforcement.275 
The Taliban interacted with local shuras who provided a 
link between the Taliban and the population and looked after 
everyday details such as supervising traffic and organizing 
the local bazaar.276  These councils were essentially 
elected by the local population.277  The local population 
chose their mullahs as well, who had a large influence over 
the councils and the population.278  The Taliban therefore 
had awareness down to the district and village level, but 
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knew enough to rely upon local tribal and religious leaders 
to manage their villages in peripheral areas.279 
Additionally, the governors, and district uluswals were 
brought in from other areas and initially rotated every few 
months to prevent internal struggles which could have been 
facilitated by local leaders remaining in control of one 
area for an extended period of time.280  Rotation became 
less rapid as the Taliban regime stabilized, but the 
principal of appointing governors from outside the 
respective provinces continued.281  These governors brought 
their own team of officials drawn from their own qowm, or 
solidarity group.282  This enabled the Taliban to appear 
external to local conflicts and facilitated rapid 
disarmament of the local population.283 
The only government ministry that the Taliban focused 
on was its religious police force, Amir bil-Maroof wa Nahi 
An il-Munkir (the department responsible for the ‘Promotion 
of Virtue and Suppression of Vice’).284  This robust force 
re-created the “mental environment of a madrassa… in the 
villages and cities of Afghanistan.”285  The Taliban police 
were on city streets and inside Afghan districts enforcing 
order and morality. 
                     
279 Bernt Glatzer, “Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal 
Disintegration?,” in Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, 
ed. William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 177. 
280 Rashid, 2001, 99; Dorronsoro, 282. 
281 Dorronsoro, 282. 
282 Dorronsoro, 281. 
283 Dorronsoro, 281. 
284 William Maley, “Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban,” in 
Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley 
(New York: New York University Press, 1998), 15. 
 68
The Taliban based their legislative and judicial 
systems upon their interpretation of Sharia law.  The 
Taliban established a shura of ulema which scrutinized all 
laws to ensure they conformed to their interpretation of 
Sharia law.286.  The Taliban maintained a separate judicial 
branch by installing qadis (judges) in all districts and 
three levels of jurisdiction in each province- a lower 
court, a court of appeals, and a higher court.287  These 
judges did not answer to the governors or the district 
chiefs.288  Additionally, the qadis’ judgements frequently 
went against tribal customs, particularly with outlawing 
badal or revenge through killings for blood vendettas.289 
To facilitate the expansion of their political control, 
the Taliban ran their warfare and their government via taxes 
upon the licit and illicit transit trade from Pakistan to 
Afghanistan’s other neighbors, the taxation of opium 
production, and from foreign aid from Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, and even Osama Bin Laden. 
With this structure and funding, the Taliban controlled 
the population of Afghanistan to varying degrees within 
their controlled areas.  “When taking over an area, the 
Taliban first [established] law and order by confiscating 
weapons and imposing a curfew at night.  The Ministry for 
the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice then 
[began] to impose Taliban social policies on the 
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population.”290  Any violators were then punished in 
accordance with the Taliban’s hybrid of Sharia Law and 
Pashtun custom as determined by Taliban law and the Taliban 
judicial system.291 
The Taliban exercised tighter control in the urban 
areas with their higher population densities through the use 
of the Taliban’s virtue and vice police who were present at 
the neighborhood level enforcing their social norms.  
However, the Taliban used an economy of force amongst the 
southern, rural Pashtun population which shared the 
Taliban’s religious and ethnic beliefs by allowing local 
tribal elements to manage day to day politics.  By governing 
at the district level, the Taliban had sufficient awareness 
at the local level to enforce stability and order, but 
allotted their security forces according to the requirements 
of the local population. 
In sum, the Taliban’s political organization shifted 
from a network form to a hierarchical form, and as the 
Taliban consolidated control of under-governed space, they 
maintained their version of law and order down to the local 
level.292  The Taliban employed a nuanced approach by 
controlling different demographics of the population  
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according to the degree of control required.293  While the 
Taliban chose to provide security, their provision of 
services was a different matter. 
3. Socio-Economic Techniques 
As the Taliban expanded their control, they relied upon 
the popular consensus they gained from their provision of 
security rather than their provision of services.  However, 
the Taliban security did provide some economic benefit to 
the population that assisted in building consensus for their 
political control. 
The Taliban were generally uninterested in providing 
services beyond security and morality.294  “The Taliban 
continuously insisted that they were not responsible for the 
population and that Allah would provide.”295  Upon seizing 
Kabul, the Taliban purged the government bureaucracy whose 
lower levels had remained in place since 1992 and replaced 
all senior Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara bureaucrats with 
Pashtuns, whether qualified or not.296  The loss of 
expertise caused ministries to largely cease to function.297  
The Taliban instead relied upon Islamic humanitarian 
organizations and western Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) to administer food and water distribution and health 
care in cities such as Kabul; and when the Taliban grew more  
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extreme in their beliefs, politics, and diplomacy, and 
closed down all NGO offices in 1998, the Taliban government 
lacked concern.298 
Though the Taliban did not fund economic development, 
portions of the general population did benefit from the 
control of the Taliban.  As trade routes re-opened from 
Pakistan through to Iran and the Central Asian Republics, 
service industries such as fuel stations, shops, and tea 
houses opened in complement.299  Small businesses benefited 
from the overall security provided by the Taliban as bazaars 
swelled with goods transited over secure routes, and because 
shop owners were not heavily taxed or regulated by the 
Taliban.300 
As the Taliban expanded their political control, they 
provided little in terms of services, but the Afghan 
population did benefit economically from the stability 
provided by the Taliban’s control.  The Taliban’s control 
enabled economic activity to occur and kept commerce routes 
free from predation.  These limited benefits assisted in 
developing some degree of popular consensus for the 
Taliban’s governance. 
4. Informational Techniques 
When the Taliban captured Kabul, they banned TV and 
music, but they retained some forms of “state” sponsored 
media to influence the population.  Of greater impact were 
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the Taliban’s use of myths as a technique to influence the 
population and gain a form of legitimacy and control. 
Upon seizing Kabul, the Taliban renamed Radio Kabul 
Radio Shariat.  The Taliban used this station to disseminate 
their edicts on social behavior and thus to influence and 
control the population.301  Additionally, the Taliban 
published a newspaper, Zarb-i Mu’minin (Onslaught of the 
Faithful), without pictures which were forbidden by the 
Taliban, which could be used to influence the population as 
well.302  But, their most interesting informational 
technique involved only word of mouth. 
The Taliban’s origins are shrouded in myths.303  The 
lay person with basic knowledge of the Taliban will likely 
know that the pious Mullah Omar, fed up with violence and 
lawlessness, organized his students to rescue girls or boys 
from being held captive and raped by local warlords.  They 
will also know that the Taliban goal of establishing law and 
order enabled them to sweep across Afghanistan “without a 
shot being fired” as warlord after warlord either 
surrendered to or joined the Taliban. 
However, experts and researchers have been unable to 
locate actual eye witnesses to these Taliban activities.  
Instead, the Taliban mythology resulted in part from the 
Taliban themselves emphasizing these themes after they 
acquired power.304  The Taliban constructed a founding 
narrative by weaving in stories of Mullah Omar experiencing 
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visionary dreams for a new Islamic order for Afghanistan.305  
The Taliban described Omar’s rescue of the abducted girls 
and Omar’s “yen” for popular justice as he hung guilty 
warlords from tank barrels.306  That the narratives would 
have a powerful influence on the Afghan population might be 
expected given their low literacy rate, but the myths spread 
internationally and became accepted as fact despite evidence 
to the contrary. 
For example, the myth that the Taliban swept across 
southern Afghanistan on “a wave of popular adulation with 
scarcely a shot fired” does not match the factual record 
where, beyond Zabul and Oruzgun provinces, the Taliban 
fought and fought hard to gain control of the under-governed 
space in Afghanistan.307 
A second myth stated that the areas that the Taliban 
conquered were overwhelmed by lawlessness and anarchy.  Yet, 
although Qandahar and its environs were indeed lawless, the 
Taliban also took control of areas like Herat where Ismail 
Khan had been recognized as having administered to the 
population through services and schools.308 
Through these myths, the Taliban were able to build a 
sort of prophecy which fellow Pashtuns could then fulfill, 
by surrendering to the Taliban like everyone else.  The fact 
that these myths spread to where they were then relayed as 
fact shows the power of these techniques.309 
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G. TECHNIQUES TO AVOID 
The Taliban successfully gained control of under-
governed space in Afghanistan, but the Taliban’s extremism 
ultimately cost them their international legitimacy.  The 
Taliban received international notoriety when they captured 
Kabul and proceeded to lock the city down and openly oppress 
women in the eyes of the local media.310  They received 
further problems when they opted to destroy the 2,000 year 
old stone Buddhas overlooking Bamiyan.  The Taliban’s lack 
of flexibility resulted in the shut down of all NGOs in the 
country on July 20, 1998 causing humanitarian problems.311 
Additionally, the Taliban failed to control their 
soldiers when they re-entered Mazar-i Sharif in 1998 and 
committed genocide against hundreds of Shia Hazarans.  The 
Taliban then refused to budge from their decision to provide 
sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden even though it cost them their 
power when the United States launched Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 
H. PAKISTAN’S INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE 
In the span of two years, the Taliban rose from a small 
militia employing small arms and numbering in the dozens to 
a force numbering between 30,000-35,000 fighters.  The 
Taliban operated infantry, aviation, armor, and artillery in 
brigade-sized operations which overwhelmed rival factions 
and the Rabbani government, and enabled the Taliban to gain 
control of under-governed space and the major political and 
economic centers of Afghanistan.  The Taliban became the new 
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central government, and they had help through all of this 
from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI.  But, 
how did the ISI influence and control the Taliban to meet 
Pakistan’s needs, and were they successful? 
The ISI came to power as an organization within 
Pakistan during the 1980s as it supported the Mujahideen 
against the Soviets.312  The “Afghan Bureau” existed within 
the ISI and consisted of ISI officers who spent extensive 
amounts of time, to include entire careers, working on 
implementing Pakistani foreign policy within Afghanistan.313  
These officers “belonged to border-straddling tribes and 
could operate undetected in civilian dress along the 
frontier or inside Afghan territory.”314  Several of these 
officers established relationships with key members of the 
Taliban when they trained them as Mujahideen guerrillas 15 
years prior.315  These networks enabled the ISI to re-
establish contact with their previous students as they began 
to gain control of under-governed space in Afghanistan.316 
The ISI were integral in enabling the Taliban to gain 
control of under-governed space.317  The ISI provided 
extraordinary logistics support, brokered key alliances, and 
assisted the Taliban in training and operational 
planning.318  The ISI did not control the Taliban though, 
because the Taliban’s ties to Pakistan went far beyond the 
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ISI to the point that the Taliban were able to gain 
resources from other Pakistani organizations.319  
Additionally, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban resulted in 
blowback that enabled the “Talibanization” of certain areas 
of tribal Pakistan.320 
In irregular warfare, logistics often hinders guerrilla 
organizations.  Battlefield capture and external support can 
assist in overcoming shortages and allow irregular forces to 
expand and grow.  The Taliban grew from a few dozen students 
to an army consisting of up to 35,000 fighters.  Early in 
their existence, the ISI allowed the Taliban to capture an 
arms depot which provided it with weapons and equipment for 
thousands of fighters.321  The ISI also worked with the JUI 
and local Pakistani madrassahs to repeatedly reinforce the 
Taliban frontlines with thousands and thousands of 
reinforcements.  The ISI supplied the Taliban with spare 
parts, fuel, ammunition, and new vehicles on a massive scale 
via links in the Pakistani Transit Mafia.322  Finally, the 
ISI bribed many of the Taliban’s opponents to convince them 
not to resist the Taliban attack.323 
The ready use of bribes certainly persuaded Taliban 
opponents to forego resistance, but the ISI also linked the 
Taliban to several key personalities that enabled them to 
continue to improve their capacity and their capabilities.  
The ISI linked the Taliban to a large cadre of former 
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communist army officers such as General Shahnawaz Tanai, the 
former Afghan Defense Minister under President 
Najibullah.324  Tanai had launched a failed coup d'état 
against communist President Najibullah and fled to Pakistan, 
but returned in the spring of 1995 with a network of former 
communist army officers from the Khalq Party.  These Khalqis 
were Pashtun and facilitated the quantum leap in military 
capability that the Taliban made from a small band of 
irregular fighters to an army of brigades and divisions able 
to fire and maneuver at night, with coordinated command and 
control able to synchronize audacious attacks and sustain 
them during rapid advance.325  Without this connection, the 
Taliban may not have survived past their defeat at the hands 
of Massoud and Ismail Khan in the summer of 1995.326  The 
ISI also connected the Taliban with Rashid Dostum, who 
provided air force technicians to repair Taliban MiG 
fighters during a lull in fighting, and possibly Jalaluddin 
Haqqani, the key jihadi leader in eastern Afghanistan who 
joined the Taliban with thousands of fighters. 
The ISI influenced the Taliban by providing them 
advisors who could assist them in training their fighters in 
Taliban training camps and in planning and coordinating 
highly kinetic military operations that enabled the Taliban 
to defeat their state and non-state rivals.  The Taliban 
ultimately grew beyond the ISI’s control, but it appears 
unlikely that the Taliban could have made the incredibly 
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rapid transformation that they did between 1994 and 1996 
without the ISI’s control and influence.327 
The Taliban gained power rapidly in a short period.  
They did this with the help of many Pakistani organizations 
beyond just the ISI.328  The Taliban’s ties to the transit 
mafia, key individuals in the Pakistani government such as 
Minister of the Interior Babar, and the social capital of 
the JUI enabled the Taliban to operate free from the control 
of the ISI.329  Finally, the ISI and Pakistan reaped what it 
had sown beginning in the 1980s.  The Taliban had used the 
Pakistani tribal areas for so long that a process of 
“Talibanization” began occurring.330  The Taliban had 
established roots in Pakistan which would prevent their 
control by the ISI.  The officers in the ISI Afghan Bureau 
further enabled this when their prolonged exposure to the 
Taliban led them to take on the Taliban’s agenda in lieu of 
Pakistan’s.331  The ISI made it possible for the Taliban to 
gain control of under-governed space, but Taliban ties to 
Pakistan outside of the ISI precluded them from being 
controlled by their sponsors.332 
I. CONCLUSION 
With the assistance of interpersonal relationships and 
networks built over two decades, the use of myths, and the 
external support from Pakistan’s ISI, the Taliban were able 
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to militarily defeat the state and non-state actors existing 
within Afghanistan between 1994 and 1998 and establish 
political control of under-governed space.  Upon 
establishing control, the Taliban maintained it by first 
establishing order.  They then opened roads to facilitate 
limited economic improvement and raised revenue by taxing 
transit trade and opium production in their areas.  The 
Taliban established a political hierarchy which extended 
from Mullah Omar through his advisory shura and a Kabul 
shura of government ministries to provincial governors and 
district uluswals who were responsible for maintaining order 
and Taliban morality in their areas.  The local leaders 
maintained control of central areas through the use of their 
“virtue and vice” police and outlying areas through 
interaction with local shuras consisting of tribal and 
religious leaders selected from within respective districts 
by the populations of those areas who appreciated the 
security provided by the Taliban after so many years of war. 
The Taliban ideology of social morality was extreme, 
especially when viewed through a western lens, and led to 
the Taliban gaining international notoriety and eventually 
to their defeat as their government was tied to the Al Qaeda 
leadership to whom the Taliban had opted to provide 
sanctuary.  Despite predictions that the Taliban would 
eventually calm their extremist actions, overtime the 
influence of Al Qaeda and western isolation led in part to 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. 
The ISI hoped to influence the Taliban to meet the 
needs of Pakistan’s foreign policy and provide Pakistan with 
“strategic depth” against India, but the Taliban had ties 
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throughout Pakistan politically, economically, and socially 
which allowed them to benefit from the ISI’s support without 
letting the ISI control them.  With the continuing 
“Talibanization” of tribal Pakistan, it appears that in the 
end, it was Pakistan which provided strategic depth to the 
Taliban.333 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This study concludes by summarizing the techniques 
observed in its case studies for how irregular forces 
established political control of under-governed spaces, and 
how organizations providing external support to the 
irregular forces influenced their surrogates.  Also from 
these case studies, additional “lessons learned” about 
irregular warfare will be identified as well as some 
suggested implications for USSOCOM, DoD, and the U.S. 
government which provide some potential topics for future 
research into additional aspects of irregular warfare. 
A. IRREGULAR TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING UNDER-GOVERNED 
SPACE 
From the cases studies of Hezbollah and the Taliban, 
this study has determined techniques for how irregular 
forces, with external support, established political control 
of under-governed space.  These cases suggest that to gain 
control of under-governed space, irregular forces should use 
a combination of coercion and persuasion.  In general, 
irregular forces will use military operations, involving 
both guerrilla and conventional warfare, dependent upon 
their opponents, to disrupt and defeat competitors inside 
their respective under-governed spaces.  As the irregular 
force disrupts its competitors, it should establish control 
of the population in its areas through a combination of 
militia check points and policing operations.  The irregular 
force can enhance its control and legitimacy by providing 
the populations in its controlled areas with security and 
services which are adjusted to the cultural expectations of 
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its target populations.  The governance provided may involve 
only basic security, but it may also include the provision 
of law enforcement, justice, education, health care, road 
construction, sanitation, and utilities such as electricity 
and water.  The key to this political control will be the 
local nature of the governance.  Irregular forces will 
require local, physical control of the population down to 
the neighborhood and village level.  Without this local 
presence, the irregular force will be unable to fully 
control its space. 
Irregular forces will enhance their influence and 
control over their target populations through the use of 
information operations in tune with the local culture.  
These operations will likely involve a combination of low-
tech word of mouth campaigns spread through local religious 
and social centers, traditional methods via radio broadcasts 
and newspapers, and hi-tech multi-media campaigns in areas 
which are plugged into satellite TV and the internet.  These 
information operations should support a chosen narrative 
which will sell the governance of the irregular force to the 
population as the irregular force performs actions in 
support of the narrative. 
These cases suggest that these irregular “lines of 
operations” should be conducted simultaneously.  
Conventional phasing and sequencing will likely not occur as 
the irregular force will possess different levels of control 
in different under-governed areas; and different 
combinations of military, political, social, economic, and 
information operations will likely be required in each 
micro-environment. 
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These cases show that the “endgame” for how an 
irregular force helps solidify and legitimize its control in 
the eyes of the international state system may depend upon 
the pragmatism of the irregular force.  In the case of 
Hezbollah, the irregular force opted to play within the 
political system of the Lebanese state; and Hezbollah 
continues to operate today.  The Taliban opted to attempt to 
take total control of Afghanistan and their extremism played 
a part in their loss of power and control in late 2001.  
These cases are ironic because Hezbollah initially sought to 
establish an Islamic state modeled after Iran while the 
Taliban initially sought regional stability around Qandahar, 
but the Taliban ultimately sought to take over Afghanistan 
and create an Islamic state while Hezbollah pragmatically 
opted to enter the Lebanese political system.  Thus, these 
cases suggest the complexity of irregular warfare and the 
potential value of external support organizations 
identifying and operating through more pragmatic irregular 
forces. 
B. TECHNIQUES FOR INFLUENCING IRREGULAR FORCES 
Based on the cases of Hezbollah and the Taliban, 
external support to irregular forces attempting to gain 
control of under-governed space should likely begin through 
the establishment of personal contacts and relationships 
prior to the formation of the irregular force.  This early 
contact can assist the external support organization in 
gaining trust and influence with the leadership of the 
irregular force.  The external support can consist of the 
provision of financing of all operations, both lethal and 
non-lethal; logistical support such as fuel, vehicles, 
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weapons, and ammunition; training inside of training camps; 
advisement from experts in military, political, social, 
economic, and information operations; and may include 
assistance in networking key indigenous parties to 
strengthen the irregular force. 
These cases suggest that establishing complete control 
over the irregular force will be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.  The external support organization may be able 
to improve its influence if it establishes a long-term 
relationship with an irregular force with a similar 
ideology, and if the external support organization maintains 
tight control of the resources being provided to the 
irregular force rather than attempting to control an 
irregular force when it receives support from multiple 
sources. 
Despite the successes observed in the cases of 
Hezbollah and the Taliban, these cases also show that 
operating through irregular forces to gain control of under-
governed spaces should not be viewed as a panacea.  For 
example, both Hezbollah and the Taliban were based upon a 
single ethnic group, and both irregular forces had 
difficulty establishing control in under-governed spaces 
where that same ethnic group did not predominate.  
Overcoming or repairing ethnic cleavages goes beyond the 
scope of this study and may call for very critical and 
realistic goal setting prior to the execution of irregular 
warfare of this variety; but despite these limitations, the 
cases did provide techniques that irregular forces and the 
external support organizations working with these forces 
used to establish political control of under-governed spaces 
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in weakened or failed states.  These techniques should 
assist in future doctrine design and irregular warfare 
campaign planning.  From this study, some additional lessons 
emerged as well. 
C. IRREGULAR LESSONS LEARNED 
In addition to providing techniques for how irregular 
forces established political control of under-governed space 
and how their external supporters controlled or influenced 
these forces, the cases in this study provided some 
additional lessons learned for future efforts in irregular 
warfare. 
1. Nature of Irregular Organizational Design 
The cases of this study displayed several facets of how 
irregular forces can organize for irregular warfare.  
Irregular warfare has been predicted to involve protracted 
struggles in the sense that insurgencies and other forms of 
irregular warfare often last for years and sometimes even 
decades, but the setting of conditions for irregular warfare 
can be protracted as well.334  In both cases, the irregular 
forces formed from social and religious networks formed over 
10 years prior to the initiation of their irregular warfare 
operations.  Additionally, in both cases the external 
support organizations established links and influence with 
members of the future irregular forces prior to the official 
formation of the irregular forces.  Finally, both irregular 
forces began as network organizations, but evolved into 
hierarchical forms as they conducted irregular warfare 
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activities.  This suggests that irregular organizations 
interacting as networks will be able to conduct common 
network activities such as passing information and 
establishing personal relationships, but may have to take on 
a more hierarchical form prior to attempting to control 
space.  The cases also suggest that under appropriate 
circumstances, external supporters can influence how the 
hierarchy takes shape through their ability to provide 
resources and credibility to selected members of the 
irregular force. 
2. Full-Spectrum Irregular Warfare 
The cases showed that irregular warfare can span the 
spectrum of warfare and involve tactical and technical 
aspects requiring a high level of training, education, and 
expertise.  In circumstances where the irregular force faces 
more powerful opponents, the irregular force will likely 
choose to conduct guerrilla warfare aimed at harassing and 
wearing down its opponents.  When the irregular force has 
parity with its opponents, then more conventional operations 
can be expected as the irregular force will not be forced to 
hit and run, but can stand and fight in hopes of inflicting 
heavier damage against its opponents.  The style of fighting 
may not be mutually exclusive and may involve both guerrilla 
and conventional fighting depending on the characteristics 
of different micro-environments.  For example, Hezbollah 
used guerrilla warfare against the Israeli Defense Forces, 
which possessed superior military power, but Hezbollah used 
more conventional warfare against its irregular opponents in 
the AMAL militias when it fought them for control of Shia 
enclaves outside the influence of the IDF.  Thus, irregular 
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forces may fight “full spectrum” irregular warfare as 
circumstances in different portions of their fight call for 
different strategies. 
Additionally, irregular warfare may involve very 
technical capabilities that require high levels of expertise 
and training.  The building of improvised explosive devices, 
suicide vests, and car bombs all require substantial 
training in electronics and explosives employment.  
Additionally, the technical skills involved in operating 
tanks, employing indirect fires, and flying aircraft require 
extensive training not often associated with guerrilla 
forces.  External supporters can offer tremendous value by 
providing this expertise either directly when they 
physically provide the expertise, or indirectly when they 
train the irregular force in the appropriate skills or link 
the irregular force with other surrogates who have the 
required skills. 
Facilitating required expertise can complicate covert 
efforts in external support.  The presence of new or 
enhanced skills not previously present in an operational 
environment may draw undesired attention to external support 
efforts aimed at hiding the source of support.  The capacity 
of the modern media only increases the complexity of covert 
operations.  These cases suggest that these risks can be 
mitigated in part through the use of training camps located 
in secure areas where expertise can be imparted outside of 
the view of prying eyes.  Additionally, efforts at 
physically advising surrogates on the battlefield can be 
hidden through controlling where advisors are located on the 
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battlefield or by utilizing advisors whose physical 
attributes blend into the irregular force. 
3. Non-Military Skills in Irregular Warfare 
Since irregular warfare involves establishing control 
over and legitimacy and support from the population, the 
studied cases confirm that non-military skills will likely 
be required to gain political control of under-governed 
space.  In certain circumstances, irregular forces may have 
the capability and capacity to physically exert control over 
an area through military force alone; however, these studies 
suggest that the use of subversion can also assist the 
irregular force in gaining control.  The use of subversion 
can reduce the amount of military effort required and can 
achieve control without actual combat. 
In addition, maintaining that control will likely 
require administrative, economic, and communications skills 
as well.  The cases displayed how irregular forces 
strengthened their control through the use of shadow 
governance in the provision of political decision-making, 
law enforcement, justice, and the provision of socio-
economic services.  As noted previously, the irregular force 
can also persuade its controlled populations through 
traditional and modern forms of media such as spreading 
myths and ideas through word of mouth and through more 
modern multi-media such as newspapers, radio, TV, and the 
internet.  These skills all require non-military expertise 
from the irregular force and suggest that irregular forces 
benefit from possessing members with the bureaucratic and 
technical skills needed to run a government; albeit a shadow 
one. 
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4. Complexity and Political Risk of Irregular Warfare 
This study suggests that irregular warfare aimed at 
controlling under-governed space through irregular forces 
may involve high levels of complexity and  
political risk.  This finding is consistent with DoD’s IW 
JOC which states that irregular warfare will be complex, 
“messy,” and ambiguous.335 
First, the cases displayed techniques which irregular 
forces seeking domestic or international legitimacy should 
likely avoid.  Both cases utilized techniques such as 
terrorism and social restrictions which were deemed extreme 
or evil by certain international and even by certain 
domestic audiences.  Different cultures consider different 
actions extreme or evil, but irregular forces’ actions 
impact how they are viewed and can have varying negative 
ramifications if their actions are found unsuitable by 
audiences with political, economic, or social influence. 
Second, both cases involved the extensive use of cash 
to facilitate irregular warfare activities.  The 
establishment of training camps, construction companies, 
social welfare organizations, and the payment of bribes all 
involved cash gathered from foreign aid and domestic forms 
of irregular taxation such as road tolls and donations such 
as religious tithing. 
Third, the cases suggest that a state providing 
external support can offer too much support if it is not 
coordinated and controlled properly.  The case of the 
Taliban showed how the Taliban received support from 
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Pakistani agencies other than the ISI such as the political 
party, JUI, the interior ministry, and local governors in 
Pakistan’s tribal areas.  These additional avenues of 
support eroded the ISI’s control over the Taliban who could 
receive support from the other agencies.  Conversely, in the 
case of Hezbollah, Iran appeared to overcome this by 
managing their support by embedding Iranians from either the 
IRGC or from the Iranian embassy in Syria into Hezbollah’s 
executive council. 
Fourth, both of these cases involved states which 
provided external support to irregular forces operating 
inside of other states with which the supporting state was 
not at war.  Iran supported Hezbollah in its resistance 
efforts against the IDF, but was not at war with the 
collapsed state of Lebanon.  Pakistan provided support to 
the Taliban to assist in meeting Pakistani foreign policy 
objectives, but was not at war with the weakened state of 
Afghanistan. 
Fifth, both irregular forces fought and disrupted the 
irregular forces of other non-state actors during their 
efforts to establish political control of under-governed 
space.  Hezbollah fought and disrupted AMAL to secure 
control of Shia enclaves.  The Taliban fought and defeated 
various competing non-state actors, but in particular 
Gulbiddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami forces. 
All of these aspects of irregular warfare represent 
complex and politically risky facets with which members of 
the U.S. government and the U.S. population may not be fully 
comfortable as they may have questions about how these 
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aspects of IW can be properly controlled by U.S. oversight 
agencies and how these aspects synch with American values. 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this study suggest potential 
implications for USSOCOM, DoD, and the United States 
government and areas of suggested future research.  These 
implications involve SOF’s ability to provide protracted, 
persistent, and proactive capabilities and capacities in 
support of the Quadrennial Defense Review and U.S. strategic 
guidance; the potential need for changes in how particular 
SOF units will organize and operate; and questions which the 
U.S. government will likely have to confront if it truly 
intends for its supporting agencies to meet its foreign 
policy objectives in support of the War on Terror. 
1. Protracted, Persistent, and Proactive Presence 
The QDR tasked SOF to expand its capabilities and 
capacity to clandestinely conduct “sustained” unconventional 
warfare in dozens of countries and to provide a persistent 
global presence in order to prepare the environment to 
counter terror networks.336  The findings within this study 
suggest that this will require a protracted, persistent, and 
proactive global presence today in order to identify and 
shape the future irregular forces of the next decade; 
however, the elements of SOF which are trained to conduct 
unconventional warfare- Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, 
and Psychological Operations-are heavily focused on the 
major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Future 
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research should address whether DoD needs to re-evaluate its 
current use of these elements if it does indeed desire a 
global presence and the potential to conduct unconventional 
warfare in dozens of countries simultaneously.  Future 
research could also address whether a central focus on two 
countries in one region limits the U.S. government’s ability 
to identify and influence future security environments if 
SOF are not developing required personal contacts today. 
2. Potential Changes for Special Operations Forces 
The findings of this study also suggest that USSOCOM 
may need to adapt how Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and 
Psychological Operations organize, train, and operate, and 
that the U.S. government may need to realistically look at 
who in the interagency will be capable of providing certain 
capabilities in different irregular warfare strategies.  The 
cases within this study suggest that to operate by, with, 
and through irregular forces to establish control of under-
governed spaces and deny sanctuary to enemies of the United 
States, SOF and the U.S. government need to be able to 
perform “full spectrum” irregular warfare and to provide 
both highly technical as well as non-military expertise to 
an irregular warfare campaign. 
Army Special Forces understand the requirement to 
operate indirectly through irregular forces from the early 
stages of unconventional warfare involving small, harassing 
guerrilla attacks to the later stages when irregular forces, 
having achieved parity with their opponents, may conduct 
more conventional operations involving maneuver warfare and 
firepower to disrupt or defeat their enemies.  Additionally, 
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units expect to 
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assist in the provision of governance and to conduct 
information operations to influence target populations. 
However, the cases studied suggest that SOF units may 
also need to be able to conduct additional activities such 
as clandestine network building and be able and willing to 
forego operating on the front lines and instead operate as 
trainers outside the prying eyes of the modern media in 
order to remain covert.  Additionally, the cases suggest 
that SOF may be required to provide expertise for building 
and administering a shadow government capable of providing 
security and services while they also tap into and influence 
traditional word of mouth networks and provide advice in 
modern radio, TV, and internet production.  The cases also 
suggest that SOF should be capable of operating 
synergistically so that as one element assists irregular 
forces as they locate and disrupt threats in an under-
governed area, a second element assists irregular forces as 
they establish a shadow government to begin to cement their 
political control of the area, while a third element assists 
an irregular force in providing security and essential 
services to the target population. 
Finally, the IW JOC suggests that either the 
interagency needs to “ruggedize” their capabilities, or DoD 
needs to build a civil-military capability to perform non-
military roles where the operational environment precludes 
other government agencies from performing these activities 
or operations.337  Future research can attempt to determine 
whether USSOCOM needs to re-organize or adapt its training, 
education, and expertise to account for the expanded 
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requirements of contemporary unconventional warfare which 
these cases suggest involve a great deal more than overtly 
organizing, training, equipping, and advising irregular 
forces to conduct only military activities.  Additionally, 
future research should be conducted to determine potential 
ramifications if USSOCOM decides to count on “other 
government agencies” to provide required non-military 
expertise before, during, and after future SOF-led 
irregular warfare campaigns, in lieu of enhancing the 
capabilities of Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and 
Psychological Operations units, and the interagency fails 
to adapt thereby leaving capability gaps. 
3. Potential Changes for the U.S. Government 
Finally, based on its case studies, this study suggests 
that the U.S. government should investigate how it plans to 
authorize and empower its subordinate agencies to conduct 
irregular warfare.  Two aspects observed within both case 
studies pose difficult dilemmas for the U.S. government. 
First, the cases show that irregular warfare can often 
involve the extensive use of cash to facilitate activities, 
but the fiscal limitations of U.S. law and bureaucratic risk 
aversion can greatly hinder the flexible use of cash.  As an 
example, after the start of the War on Terror, the U.S. 
Congress authorized funding for SOF to facilitate 
unconventional warfare activities, but this authorization, 
commonly referred to as “1208 Funding,” expired at the end 
of Fiscal Year 2007.338  This funding provided fiscal 
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authorizations which enhanced SOF’s ability to operate by, 
with, and through irregular forces, but limitations were 
emplaced by some mid-level DoD comptrollers who were 
uncomfortable with the new authorization because they feared 
that SOF would abuse the use of the funding.339  These 
actions by DoD comptrollers provide an example of the 
discomfort felt by some U.S. government personnel when 
operators are empowered with cash to facilitate IW 
operations.  Future research should investigate how the U.S. 
government can provide the amounts of cash needed to 
facilitate IW activities, and how it can overcome the 
bureaucratic aversion to “uncontrolled” cash in the 
contemporary operating environment. 
Second, although the case studies of Hezbollah and the 
Taliban observed how irregular forces could control under-
governed space, they each provided examples of how irregular 
forces, with external support, disrupted and defeated other 
non-state actors in their areas as they fought for control 
inside of states with which the states providing external 
support were not at war.  The IW JOC introduces this 
scenario involving DoD’s use of unconventional warfare 
through irregular forces to disrupt a non-state actor such 
as a terrorist group which has found sanctuary within a 
“non-belligerent state” with whom the United States is not 
at war.340  The JOC emphasizes that this scenario poses 
extreme political and military risk.341  In addition to the 
political risk involved in operating in non-belligerent 
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states, elements of the U.S. military do not presently feel 
comfortable with conducting unconventional warfare even in 
support of major combat operations as it does not produce 
the cleaner and more predictable results of conventional 
warfare.342  Given that the concept of one irregular force 
defeating a rival irregular force in an under-governed area 
is not new, future research should attempt to address how 
the U.S. government can overcome its aversion to conducting 
unconventional warfare against non-state actors inside of 
non-belligerent states, and if U.S. policy calls for this 
strategy, how U.S. political leaders can overcome the 
cultural aversion to the strategy within the Department of 
Defense to ensure that the capability and the capacity exist 
when called. 
E. SUMMARY 
To conclude, under-governed spaces have been identified 
by the U.S. government as potential sanctuaries or safe 
havens for threats to the United States, and the Department 
of Defense has determined that it will act to deny this 
sanctuary.  One strategy for denying this sanctuary is to 
assist indigenous elements to establish political control of 
the under-governed space; however, if the state responsible 
for the under-governed space does not have legitimacy with 
its population, another course of action could call for 
employing SOF to operate indirectly through irregular forces 
who can achieve legitimacy with the population to establish 
political control of the space. 
                     
342 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan & The Troubled Future of 
Unconventional Warfare.  (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 177-
180. 
 97
The cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan provided examples of how irregular forces 
established control of under-governed space through the  
coercion and persuasion of military, political, social, 
economic, and informational techniques.  In these cases, the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence provided techniques for how 
organizations providing external support to irregular forces 
can influence their surrogates in order to allow the state 
providing the external support to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives.  From these cases, additional lessons learned 
were developed about irregular warfare and implications were 
detailed which offer suggestions for future research into 
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